Islamist Movements

Wickham contends that the recent rise of Islamist movements in the Middle East are a direct response to Western political, social, economic and cultural domination of the region, and furthermore were a response to the failed economics (and suppression by) authoritarian regimes over the course of many years. The analysis behind this contention is sound and provides a strong explanation for the changing social dynamics of the region, however perhaps does not go far enough.

Personally, I believe the recent rise in popularity of Islamic movements (from moderates to extremists) is a direct response to the long time domination of secular, authoritarian regimes. To begin with, these dictatorships have spent many decades brutally suppressing public collectivization and dissent. Furthermore, the economic policies of the region have arguably failed in non-rentier states that lack the presence of natural resources (oil) in any significant abundance, which is often used to pacify the public.  This combination of brutality, illegitimacy, and failed economics in usually secular-leaning regimes have led to many believing that secularism was the problem all along. This gave Islamic movements greater legitimacy and support as the counterweight to years of secularist oppression.

In addition to the authoritarianism, my personal belief is that the root cause behind the "Islamization" of the region has been the history of colonialism and/or dominance by the West. The formation of all these artificial states, as we discussed earlier in the semester, is the cause of much of what we see happening today. By grouping different ethnicities and religions with centuries of hostility, the colonizers were able to pave the way for the rise of the Arab dictator, which in turn is the cause of the rise of today's Islamic movements. Furthermore, more recent Western dominance and its perceived exploitation of the region's resources, people, and governments has led to a recent backlash that personified itself in the form of Islamist movements. The rise in strength, manpower, and influence of the Islamists has been a big avenue for many to resist the perception of Western interventionism in the region.

Finally, and this is not explored by Wickham, I think a strong reason behind the rise of these movements in the region has been Turkey. The Erdogan Administration has wielded huge influence in the region, particularly in the wake of the revolts in the region. This administration, itself Islamist, has been perceived as a model for the future of many Arab states in the region, giving credence to the belief that political Islamist models are the right ways forward. This is in addition to the alleged direct influence that  Turkey wields over many Islamist groups in the region through the provision of military and financial support as well as the control of movement into and out of Syria and Iraq.

Islamists and Social Movements

First off, Wickham makes two things clear from the start: that the Islamic movement's base in Egypt, from the beginning of its rise in popularity in the 1970s, was educated students and professionals (unlike what might otherwise be assumed and unlike class divisions in other countries); and that the vast majority has been, and continues to be, decidedly nonviolent. I think that these points are significant because of the tendency that Western perspectives and media have to demonize anything "Islamic", whether intentionally or otherwise.

As has been pointed out, she is among the first of Western scholars to deeply examine Islamic movements within the framework of social movement research, as well as contributing to it. She points out that in cases such as Egypt where mass resistance seeking fundamental change against authoritarian rule is against the best interests of the individual and that, moreover, the typical theories of unfulfilled grievances or cultural identification do not serve as complete explanations as to why Islamic movements have been so successful. For one thing, she asserts that it has not been so much collective action but the decades-long structures and networks in place. The authoritarian regime was blind to the extent of these these structures and support because they were on the "periphery", due to necessity and inability to act through central political structures. Through these localized networks, the Islamic movement was able to mobilize people politically through giving people *new* motivations (interpreting Islamic ideologies in ways that made the public good take priority over individual benefit) and opportunities for collective action.

 I believe it's a combination of Wickham's theory of pervasive structures and ideologies in place, combined with the overthrow of the authoritarian regimes that suppressed them, combined with the high unemployment, ongoing economic instability and inequalities that have fueled a myriad of reasons for frustration have certainly played a role. In class, we have often referred to the gap that the state has failed to adequately fill, and where Islamist movements see an opportunity to step in, from helping to meet basic needs to education to giving a voice to segments of the population that feel overlooked. I still believe these reasons to be valid, as well as the fact that both the Mobarek and Ben Ali regimes were for decades supported by the secular West - billions in military and other aid, much from the US government but also from IFI's - and that was not lost on the general public. I also believe that we can not dismiss the idea that a militarized state often ends up radicalizing groups with fewer economic prospects, and that includes educated youth struggling with unemployment, etc.

Islamist Social Movements

The most noticeable difference in Rosefsky Wickham's analysis of Islamic social movements, is that she studies it first and foremost as a social movement and then, applies the context of it being an Islamic social movement. From a reader perspective, this offers a far simpler explanation because these Western social movement theories are often quite well known and then compounded with my own knowledge of Islam and its culture, it made understanding the theories much easier. I believe this approach, serves to underscore the cultural additions of Islamic social movements. 

In her writing, Rosefsky Wickham underscores the social welfare components of many Islamist movements. These charitable acts create a bond between communities and Islamic organizations and also casts a favorable light on these organizations. According to some studies, there were as many as 8,000 Islamic voluntary associations present in Egypt in the early 1990s. (99, Rosefsky Wickham) During the 1980s and 1990s, there was also growth in a variety of Islamic organizations to include Islamic publishing houses and large Islamic manufacturing conglomerates. This growing private sector presence propelled Islamic mobilization in two ways- it supplied funds and logistical support to political Islamic groups and also created a space for "ideological outreach and network-building." (102) 

The social welfare aspects of these organizations are a significant contributor of what has yielded Islamist movements success in the post-Arab revolution MENA area. The authoritarian regimes present here, often have a huge disconnect with their populations and many Islamist movements are able to provide for whatever is lacking. The community that many of these organizations foster, through their social welfare programs, supply a favorable alternative to the government. Post- Arab revolts, this favorable reputation that had been built was effectively used to gain political leverage. 

A secular mood?

Do the electoral results in Egypt and Tunisia post-2011 support a claim that people are particularly religious in the MENA region? Has Edward Said, who once said he felt the “predominant mood of the Arab world is very secular,” been proven wrong?

Islamist Movements

Wickham identifies two mainstream explanations for the rise of Islamic social movements. They are both grievance-based. The first is the “cultural identity” viewpoint. This perspective sees the rise of Islamic activism as a force that grew in direct opposition to the domination of MENA states by the West. This logic sees Islamic social movements as a collective protest and shaking off of decades, if not centuries, of Western cultural domination. Muslims then proceed to reclaim their true identity and values in their Islamic heritage. The second viewpoint is one of “political economy.” This perspective argues that secular authoritarian regimes failed to provide economic growth, social equity, and political rights for their citizens. This has resulted in high unemployment levels and housing shortages. This particularly affects ambitious, educated, lower-middle-class youth who are left wth few options for the future. Youth then express these grievances through political Islam. This is the typical viewpoint, which is often perpetuated in Western media.

Wickham regards these two perspectives as valid but incomplete. In addition to these motivating factors, it is necessary to have a catalyzing force. Movement leaders can use pre-existing grievances, but must add motivations, resources, and opportunities to create social action. In the Middle East, elites used political Islam for just this purpose. There are also important environment factors to take into consideration. While authoritarian regimes suppress opposition, Islam had an existing network and the infrastructure that could be used to gain political control. Through this argument, Wickham takes the cultural identity and political economy movements to another level. It explains how movement leaders had the reach to mobilize such a large group as well as the rhetoric that the youth could rally behind.

One of the main concerns for youth is the future – jobs, households, and families. In many MENA countries, the youth bulge resulted in a large, young population that did not have these opportunities. Many were educated but unable to find work without wasta, a connection. Many Islamists groups began by providing services to the people that met needs like these that the state overlooked. This is an important explanation, which gives insight into how the Islamist groups so quickly rose to power. Also, the dispersed, local network of Islamic institutions allowed their message to reach across the cities, with a lower risk of identification and suppression by authoritarian governments. 

Wickham's Framework

I came into the reading without much background on Islamist social movements. I was aware that Islamist organizations, such as Hizballah and the Muslim Brotherhood, often fill gaps left by weak state institutions, providing services and organizing communities.  I was also generally aware of the demographic problems faced by much of MENA, where youth unemployment is high, and disaffected young people offer an easily accessible base of support for reform movements.

The element I found most useful about Wickham's argument was the way she structured her analysis. I find many of her arguments are simply intuitive. I don't find it very controversial to say that the success of a social movement depends on the openness of the political landscape, the ability of the movement to mobilize resources, and the discursive opportunities for outreach, as all of these factors very logically play a role in social mobilization.  But placing Islamist movements in this framework makes the analysis clearer, enables the reader to mentally contrast the circumstances of Islamists with other social movements, and provides a repeatable process for assessing future movements.

To your second question, I think that the success of Islamist movements in the post-2011 environment stems largely from the ability of what Wickham might term the "parallel Islamic sector" to mobilize resources.  Since Islamist networks had informally established their ability to provide local governance and had already developed networks and a sense of community, when the political sector opened after the revolts, Islamist organizations were able to more quickly and effectively leverage their bases for political purposes.

KSA and Sweden

I thought this could be of interest, specially to our Professor:) http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2015/03/20/sweden-stood-up-for-human-rights-in-saudi-arabia-this-is-how-saudi-arabia-is-punishing-sweden/

Islamists and Social Movements

Since you have your midterm this week, the deadline for this question is not March 23, but March 30. This week, your readings focus on Islamist movements in the region. Carrie Rosefsky Wickham's book is concerned with the question of what has motivated thousands of students and professionals across the Muslim world to join the Islamic movement, despite the personal risks that such participation often entails. Compared to what you may have read on this topic in the past, what is different about her approach to studying Islamist movements? In our current 'post-Arab Revolts' environment, why do you think Islamists in particular have yielded such successes at the ballot box, in both Tunisia and Egypt?

Why has the MENA region been so resistant to democratic reform?

There are many factors participating to the resistance against democratization of the MENA region. To explain the Middle East exceptionalism, one has to analyze each country from a historical, economic and political context in order to provide a holistic understanding of this exception.

The Case of Algeria:

Although Algeria shares many of the factors that led Arab countries to revolt such as, authoritative regimes and unemployment, Algerians tend to be resistant to democratic reforms. To understand the reasons behind the lack of enthusiasm towards major democratic reforms, one has to understand the complex history of this country. From a historical context, Algeria experienced various sorts of revolutions ranging from the colonial revolution, Berber revolution and 1988 revolution. In the 1988, Algeria was under the rule of the National Liberation Front (FLN), who prohibited freedom of press and the existence of multi-party system. Additionally, at this time, opposition groups were watched very closely by the secret services known as DGSN.

 However, after the oil shock, the living conditions in Algeria became unbearable. Algerian youth finally went out and started a revolution. This has led to some democratic reforms and the fall of single-party system. However, Things took an unexpected turn and Algeria plunged into political instability. Although, the 1988 revolution resulted in some positive changes such as the introduction of multipartism and democratic reforms, the revolution eventually led to terrifying Algerian Civil War.

This early revolution helps explain why Algerians are resistant to democratic change. They had an early Arab Spring that caused more than 100,000 deaths (no clear statistics), followed by year of political and economic instability, and years of terrorism. It is not until the last past decade that Algeria managed to restore stability within the country. To finally answer the question, Algeria is resistant to the change because of:

(1)         Its experience with revolution and democratic reforms. The 1988 revolution introduced minor positive changes in comparison to negative consequences it had on Algeria’s economy, politics and security.

(2)          Fear and fatigue, Algerians fear the return of the early 1990’s experience, where it was extremely unsafe to travel within Algeria, where Islamist almost took over. Therefore, they would rather keep the imperfect status quo.

(3)         Oil, oil, oil, as long as the government is able to buy its citizens and provide minimum acceptable living conditions, as long as oil revenue keep flowing from government to citizens, people won’t revolt. 

Each country has its own history and understanding why each country is resistant to democratic change, necessitates a thorough examination of their politico-economic history!  

Newsweek: U.S. Omits Iran and Hezbollah From Terror Threat List

I thought I should share an article I felt was pretty relevant to our discussion last class about militarization in the region. This is also huge news regarding geopolitics in the Middle East in general. Here is the link: http://www.newsweek.com/iran-and-hezbollah-omitted-us-terror-threat-list-amid-nuclear-talks-314073

Resistance to democratic reform

The MENA region's general resistance to democratic reform can be interpreted from two not-entirely-independent perspectives: popular unwillingness/inability and elite unwillingness. From a popular point of view, democracy runs counter to the philosophy of corporatism as expressed by Richards and Waterbury, making it an infeasible form of government for those who believe in the merit of corporatism. The propagated post-independence dichotomy between foreign imperial powers (democratic nations) and the domestic state as the protector certainly supports the notion of non-democratic political systems. Also according to Richards and Waterbury, electoral laws have changed so frequently in a number of countries that perhaps their populaces have lost faith in the ability of democratic elections to produce valid and meaningful results. Economic reform and structural adjustment, which may be financed and advised by foreign countries and organizations and may be predicated on political reform, have necessarily benefited all classes (Bayat). If people in MENA countries view political liberalization with being somehow related to a stagnant or declining personal financial situation they may be unwilling to endorse democratization. Finally, patronage and corruption show people that they can achieve a financially satisfactory life for themselves, friends and/or relatives without the utilization of democratic principles such as meritocracy and rule of law, creating, in theory, a mentality of "why fix it if it's not broken." Bayat's theory of 'quiet encroachment' as a viable strategy for the poor to influence state policy (such influence being absent given a lack of democracy) also falls into this notion that a relatively "good" (for lack of a better word) life can be obtained without a system of democracy. From an elite/government perspective, vested interests in protecting authoritarian gains via economics leave little reason for those in power to support democratic transition (Owen). This is especially true for rentier states which lack a social contract with their citizenry to necessitate representing them in state-level policymaking. Demmelhuber's enumeration of Egyptian rents - natural resource revenues, tourism, state-owned economic areas, foreign remittances, and external aid - also exist to some extent in other MENA countries. 

Bellin argues that democratic transition can only be successful in those countries where the coercive apparatus lacks the will and ability to crush it and that the existence of this will and ability is what has made authoritarianism so robust in MENA countries. She also states that "Nowhere in the region do you see mammoth, cross-class coalitions mobilizing on the streets to push for reform as in South Korea" - an assertion that couldn't be farther from the truth given the Arab Revolts of 2011. Finances allowed for robust regimes but didn't stop mass protests from causing the demise of regimes. Rents certainly don't appear to have propped up at least the Libyan and Egyptian governments in 2011. Bellin also believes that patrimonialism, which supports authoritarianism via favoritism and patronage to demobilize the opposition, is part of the reason for authoritarian prevalence. Given the fact that corruption was a main grievance underlying Arab Spring protests which led to regime change, patrimonialism was not enough to stem the tide of reform in a number of countries. International support - another pillar of Bellin's argument about the robustness of authoritarian regimes in the region - played a supportive role in Bahrain, a destabilizing one in the case of Syria, and doesn't seem to have had much of an effect in other Arab Spring cases. I would argue that Bellin was wrong about high costs of dissent incurred on citizens and the robustness of authoritarianism. Additionally, her argument that coercive apparatuses will be more willing to accept transition if they are institutionalized is difficult to evaluate because we cannot be sure of the apparatuses' perception of their security without further investigation of the topic. With these points in mind, it does appear she was correct in asserting that "in the absence of effective state institutions, removing an oppressive coercive apparatus will not spell democracy but rather the rise of authoritarianism of a different stripe or, worse, chaos." Yemen, Syria and Libya have all experienced the demise of the preexisting authoritarian entity but have not transitioned into stable democracies. Egypt encountered democratic reform but both its citizenry acted in undemocratic fashion when removing the president in 2013.  In every case except Tunisia, coercion seems to have made way for relative chaos.

Democracy and Coercive Institutions

For the most part I find Bellin's arguments compelling, even in a post-2011 context.  The argument that coercive and patrimonial institutions make democratization more difficult should not be an overly controversial one.

I do think that Bellin's account understates the importance of both popular mobilization and economic factors. Bellin relegates popular mobilization to a single factor influencing the strength of MENA's coercive institutions.  Specifically, she concludes that "Where that coercive apparatus remains in tact and willfully opposed to political reform, democratization will not occur."  To make this judgement largely denies the publics of MENA states agency in the democratic futures of their states.  Given the popular uprisings of 2011, it would probably be more accurate to say, "Where the coercive apparatus' capability and will to repress political reform exceeds the will of the public pursue it, democratization will not occur." As the 2011 uprisings show, coercive institutions need not be totally dismantled before change can occur.  Though many of the states involved in these uprisings continue to face significant obstacles to popular mobilization--such as the divide discussed by Asef Bayat between Islamist and secular groups that can be seen today in Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt--in these circumstances I would view popular mobilization as a factor directly competing with coercive institutions, rather than a factor in evaluating their strength.

The uprisings of 2011, which were motivated significantly by economic factors, would seem to demonstrate that the power of coercive institutions can face significant challenges from publics even in the absence of significant changes in the other factors Bellin mentions.  Bayat's "quiet encroachment" also would seem to place a heavier emphasis on economics and popular mobilization than Bellin's model provides.

MENA and Democratization

Why has the MENA region been so resistant to democratic reform? In light of the Arab Revolts of 2011, what do you think of Bellin’s argument (Mar 2 reading)? Include relevant March 16 readings in your response.

Political Legitimacy in Rentier States:

Political Legitimacy in Rentier States:

The nature of the relationship between Rentier states and their citizens is very straightforward and depends on the circulation of the revenue collected from natural resources. Unlike other governments that are not blessed with natural resources, rentier states do not depend on domestic taxation as the main source of revenue. The national budget relies on nontax revenues such as oil revenues, aid and loans. In the case of the MENA region, revenues are often obtained from exporting oil and gas. However, unlike the oil-exporter countries, there are some rentier states such as Jordan and Syria that rely on another type of rent—loan and foreign aid—to fund their budget.  

As a result, rentier states do not heavily depend on the population to ensure a functioning economy. It is rather the opposite. The population depends on a well-functioning government to ensure individuals’ well-being. This makes rentier states financially independent from their citizens, which gives the government legitimacy over their population. In other words, it disconnects the state from its citizens.

On the other hand, and although the state is able to buy its independence from its citizens, it is crucial to emphasize that its national independence is bought at a price of an international dependence. The different kinds of rents—be they loans, oil and gas exports or aid—come with either risk or conditions. In global and interconnected economic systems, oil prices are prone to fluctuation. Therefore, having an undiversified economy that depends highly on natural resources as the main revenue is extremely risky. This is because the relation between a rentier state and its population functions as long as money is flowing to individuals in forms of entitlements, which could be seen as a bargain. Once that relationship of bargain is jeopardized and the state is no longer able to ensure a good financial well-being of its citizens, people will start revolting and the country will plunge into a period of political instability. 

As explained in Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World book, the phenomenon of rentier state does not ensure stability nor does it depoliticize the society. It simply reduces the need for a rentier government to respond to a requested political change. The fact that rentier states are not heavily dependent on its domestic work force, they could ignore the need for political reforms. Therefore, to finally answer the question: yes I believe rentier states have more political legitimacy in the eyes of their citizens as long money keeps flowing from the government to its population. Sustaining this relation does not disconnect citizens and does not reduce their political involvement; it just gives the government the choice to ignore the need for political change.

Military and State in Egypt

One can argue that there are three main turning points in the recent history of Egypt that shaped the relation between the military, the state and the society. Firstly, the 1952 revolution (or coup depending on where you stand) when the Military ousted the king and abolished the multiparty political system. Second the peace treaty with Israel, which ushered in a new era for the army. An era where the war has become less demanded and economy has started to be more attractive. Third, the rule that the army played during the January 25 revolution in Egypt where the army presence has become more explicit and reached its peak with installing Al-Sissi as president. The 1952 revolution gave the military not only a type of revolutionary legitimacy, but also the right to claim very exclusive rights of the country. In fact, the regional and international circumstances back then has helped the Army to as the high strides voices of independence and the battle of development were resonated throughout the third world. The war against Israel was also a crucial factor to consolidate the army grip over the power in Egypt, though the defeat in 1697 casted heavy shadows of doubts about those exclusive rights. Then the victory of 1973 restored part of it but definitely not all of it. After the peace treaty with Israel, it was expected that the army would gradually withdraw from political life in Egypt, especially after President Sadat started a very cautious multiparty system as a base of nascent democracy. However, the assassination of Sadat on the hands of Isalmist army officers and ascending of Mubarak to power, gave the army the opportunity to play more active role in the economy. The argument is simple; with peace with Israel, the army can use its capabilities in the developments projects. Mubarak also started to give the military officers who retired in their forties some middle but sensitive positions in the bureaucratic apparatus of the government. In contrast to what many people think Mubarak through his 30 years in office was the only president who had very few military generals in the cabinet. I can say with little doubts that during Sadat and Mubarak reigns (though both of them military themselves), the army remained important and present but not as flagrant as during Nasser’s or nowadays. Actually, the January 25 uprising has helped bringing the army to power in an explicit and may be violent way. Due to the pseudo-democracy that Mubarak has shepherded through his autocratic rule where no real political powers evolved, when he stepped down, the army and the Muslim Brotherhood were the only two (political) powers in Egypt. What we are seeing now is ongoing battle between the future and the past. Those who want to go back to the sixties and those who want to get their first step in the twenty first century.

The Military and the State in Syria and Egypt

Analyzing the relationship between the military and the state in MENA countries requires an understanding of the historical, social, and political developments of each state, especially recent, ongoing, or potential wars or internal conflicts. In the cases of Egypt and Syria, after military coups, new regimes supplanted old ones and legitimized their influence through controlling, strengthening, and expanding the state’s military. The militaries have become so relatively strong that they affect their respective state’s social, political, and economic institutions including political offices and leaders, as well as various paramilitary and non-military industries and economic sectors.

Syria was heavily involved in Lebanese politics and the Arab-Israeli conflict leading to increased military expenditures to forty percent of the annual budget by the 1980s. The Assad regime institutionalized the army to the point where they had a significant impact on all kinds of national policies. This expansion included the development of factories to maintain and build new weapons and the employment hundreds of thousands into the armed forces. Moreover, the influence of the military expanded into areas of non-military activity through control of business enterprises such as resources and utility management and housing. Eventually, through control of the military, the Assad regime protected its minority rule from coups and allowed the regime to stave off political competition from individuals, or segments of the population, as is happening now during Civil War.

Egypt’s Presidents have in modern history ran the state through the military, including individuals such as Abu Ghazella, Hosni Mubarak, and now General Sisi, who were all from military backgrounds. With the aim suppressing both plots against the state, as well as Islamic fundamentalism, Egyptian governance has manifested itself as a military-police state, mainly carried out via military control of internal security. The Egyptian military has expanded into influencing everyday life through the Central Security Police, often trumping individual liberties of society through military courts to suppress riots or political dissidents. Currently, President Sisi is well known for his suppression of political dissidents even after two recent revolutions. Even more so than Syria, Egypt’s military extends into business industries in the production of other sectors of the state, such as running factories of automobiles, televisions, agriculture, and other industries of  private capital and contracting.