Wickham's Framework

I came into the reading without much background on Islamist social movements. I was aware that Islamist organizations, such as Hizballah and the Muslim Brotherhood, often fill gaps left by weak state institutions, providing services and organizing communities.  I was also generally aware of the demographic problems faced by much of MENA, where youth unemployment is high, and disaffected young people offer an easily accessible base of support for reform movements.

The element I found most useful about Wickham's argument was the way she structured her analysis. I find many of her arguments are simply intuitive. I don't find it very controversial to say that the success of a social movement depends on the openness of the political landscape, the ability of the movement to mobilize resources, and the discursive opportunities for outreach, as all of these factors very logically play a role in social mobilization.  But placing Islamist movements in this framework makes the analysis clearer, enables the reader to mentally contrast the circumstances of Islamists with other social movements, and provides a repeatable process for assessing future movements.

To your second question, I think that the success of Islamist movements in the post-2011 environment stems largely from the ability of what Wickham might term the "parallel Islamic sector" to mobilize resources.  Since Islamist networks had informally established their ability to provide local governance and had already developed networks and a sense of community, when the political sector opened after the revolts, Islamist organizations were able to more quickly and effectively leverage their bases for political purposes.