I can not speak for the citizens of
“rentier states” but I have given some thought to this subject. I
also can't generalize due to the fact that there is quite a bit of
variation between different regimes and their policies. In my
opinion, the theory underestimates how certain levels of political
stability, corruption, and foreign intervention would affect the
perceived legitimacy of a given state. In the cases of Libya and Iraq
– both of which continue to be failed states – it would be hard
to believe that anyone has considered any of their regimes legitimate
for many years, pre- or post-US involvement. However, within the GCC,
oil rents have been used partly to actually strengthen certain
aspects of their economies, not to mention large investments in
infrastructure and education. Based on what I've read, many youth in
the GCC and even in Iran are not necessarily looking to cause
revolutionary change in their governments, but rather seeking gradual
reforms. (Of course, many young Iranians are thoroughly disillusioned
with their government, but perhaps grudgingly accept some level of
legitimacy because they see no other realistic possibility of
change.)
No matter how much a “rentier state”
distributes its wealth to average citizens, one can easily find
evidence of demands for more rights. Especially with increasingly
educated populations who are tuned into the discrepancy between their
rights and the rights given to citizens of other nations, the
level/perception of legitimacy somehow might have begun to be less
relevant than the ability to have one's government recognize certain
rights and freedoms. And even “rentier states” that might not
seem obligated to or concerned with answering the demands of their
people have given in to some pressure for certain legal and other
reforms, thereby increasing their legitimacy and narrowing the
disconnect between state and citizens.
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