http://www.cnn.com/2016/03/28/politics/isis-losses-iraq-syria-brussels/
I'm taking a page from Ahmed's book and playing fast and loose with the blog because I believe this is an interesting development in the Middle East given last week's discussion on social movement theory. During our class I remarked to Julio the similarities between the components of effective social mobilization and the components of an effective insurgency. I'll go over the points shortly, but I believe they're important to consider given the recent press surrounding ISIS. Over the last two weeks in the wake of the Brussels attacks and increased activity by ISIS affiliates in Africa, the western media has focused on the destruction of ISIS territory as if it is a measurable metric to their defeat. In the above article U.S. Secretary of Defense Ash Carter is cited as saying, "We are systematically eliminating ISIL's cabinet", referring to the killing of key leaders as a measurable success in the fight against terrorism. For starters, yes ISIS is a terrorist organization, but looking at it only in that light fails to recognize how its moment and personnel actually operate at an organizational level.
I'm taking a page from Ahmed's book and playing fast and loose with the blog because I believe this is an interesting development in the Middle East given last week's discussion on social movement theory. During our class I remarked to Julio the similarities between the components of effective social mobilization and the components of an effective insurgency. I'll go over the points shortly, but I believe they're important to consider given the recent press surrounding ISIS. Over the last two weeks in the wake of the Brussels attacks and increased activity by ISIS affiliates in Africa, the western media has focused on the destruction of ISIS territory as if it is a measurable metric to their defeat. In the above article U.S. Secretary of Defense Ash Carter is cited as saying, "We are systematically eliminating ISIL's cabinet", referring to the killing of key leaders as a measurable success in the fight against terrorism. For starters, yes ISIS is a terrorist organization, but looking at it only in that light fails to recognize how its moment and personnel actually operate at an organizational level.
8 elements of a successful insurgency
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Critical Mass
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A better idea
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Strong, charismatic leader
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Resources
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External Support
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Communications
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Safe Havens
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Intelligence
The above list will never be exhaustive, but it does provide a solid framework for the elements necessary for an insurgent movement to start, sustain and succeed. Certain components are not always necessary and many times an insurgent movement can succeed absent some of these elements depending on the type of movement and the structure of the the institutional power being combatted. The most interesting aspect of what makes most insurgent movements successful over the last 60 or so years has been the rise of public opinion. As we spoke about with social movements, the role of public opinion has been a critical factor for mobilization of personnel and the ideological battle against a national power. Many of the Arab Spring uprisings were able to gain additional traction when the governments being protested against forcefully tried to quash the movement, ultimately galvanizing the movement in the eyes of the populace.
Social Movement Theory levels of analysis
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Political opportunities and constraints
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Resource mobilization
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Discursive opportunities and constraints
The list above about Social Movement Theory and some of the other factors we discussed in class illustrate parallels between these types of uprisings.
If you read the CNN article completely you will see there is mention that the percentage of lost territory is not a perfect metric for determining the degradation of ISIS. Again, this will be apparent as it is commonly known that ISIS will likely attempt more attacks outside of Syria and Iraq. Just as social movements against a legitimate political actor can have fluctuating tempos and wins/losses over a period of time (we see the ups and downs of political reformation following Egypt's popular movement), it is important to look at ISIS not as a static actor set only on establishing a Caliphate that is territory based. Terrorists, Islamists or political dissidents all have a goal aimed at some ideological turnaround of their current situation and it often includes utilizing the eight elements of an insurgency. Just as we look at the entire spectrum of political, economic and social factors that contribute to the states in the MENA region, it is important to consider that even non-state actors have varying success with these same factors when mobilizing personnel, resources and gaining external recognition in advancing their ideological cause.
This is a great comparison. I didn't readily make the connection last week in class. I think we can also apply this framework to understand what factors may/will continue to hamper ISIS moving forward. The brutality and anti-Western rhetoric may be attract some recruits, but will eventually minimize the external support and undermine the necessary resource mobilization for sustaining the State. ISIS can sell oil on the black market, but it is challenging, costly, and less profitable than selling directly to a state customer. The brutality is also a discursive constraint on expanding their support network, probably preventing it from reaching a tipping point for a sustained movement. Brutality fails to resonate broadly enough among the populace to gain mass long term.
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