History is right
now being made in Tunisia: a new constitutional framework appears close to being
approved by the National Constituent Assembly. If the final articles are
approved, this will be the first successfully negotiated constitution in a
post-Arab Spring country. This is no doubt an important development because for
a long time, instead of “middle of the road” cooperation between moderate
Islamists and political secularists, actors from across the political spectrum
appeared unable to reach a common framework for politics. After two “moderate”
Islamist parties democratically ascended to power in post-revolution Tunisia
and Egypt (Ennahda and the Muslim Brotherhood respectively), democratic
secularists grew increasingly suspicious of a creeping “Islamization” of
politics, fearing that the secular authoritarianism they struggled to get rid
of was slowly being replaced by oppressive Islamism. In Egypt, all signs point
to a military-led reversal to the secular authoritarian security state of old,
while Tunisia – as it seems – is moving toward a brighter future.
However, there
is reason to be very cautious before declaring Tunisia a democratic success
story, because while political leaders have finally been able to compromise and
produce a new constitutional framework within which to conduct politics, 2013
saw some of the worst political violence in Tunisia since the revolution,
including the assassinations of two secular activists and widespread unrest in
the streets. A stagnant economy, high unemployment (as high as 35 percent among youths), and a conservative Islamist base may mean that Ennahda’s leadership,
which has finally had to live up to its moderate rhetoric, will pay the price
for what many observers has perceived as ‘doublespeak’ – speaking one language
in front of a secular (and international) audience, and another when speaking
to a conservative audience.
This is not an
unusual practice among politicians – Republicans and Democrats in the United
States tend to do the same thing (Mitt Romney’s etch-a-sketch reset of 2012
comes to mind). This can become a serious problem when the different audiences
diverge fundamentally on crucial questions such as, for instance, what should
be the source of legal authority in the land – God (as interpreted by religious
authorities) or a secular independent judiciary?
Moderate
Islamist parties, such as Tunisia’s Ennahda, have to communicate with their more conservative base within a certain
discursive framework, while trying to operate within another discursive
framework when confronted with a different audience. In a democracy you are
supposed to have diverging views and dissenting voices. But for a functioning
democracy, you have to agree on the parameters
for politics, the very framework within which all actors will meet in
discourse. The real test for Tunisia’s future isn’t whether the new constitution
passes, but whether the framework it establishes will be accepted and respected
by all political actors. Unless it can function as a common discursive
framework within which political contention can be resolved through
institutional mechanisms, a state of politics will prevail where actors resort
to extra-institutional, and often violent, means.
Yesterday, Carnegie published a piece by the Tunis-based freelance journalist Sarah Mersch on the new constitution. For those of you interested, the full text is available at http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/2014/01/21/tunisia-s-compromise-constitution/gyzs
ReplyDeleteYes - and it illustrates the internal contradictions in the constitution, which opens up for competing interpretations. Regardless of the content of the constitution, I wonder if Americans in particular put too much faith in constitutions because of the sacrosanct status of their own constitution. While also constitutional democracies, many European states are not at all as reliant on their founding documents - they are much more of living documents than the US constitution and do not hold the same status among the general public. For instance, you could never mobilize Swedes on the basis of something being 'unconstitutional,' it's simply not a framing of an issue that would resonate. I do think we should be positive about the mere fact that political actors in Tunisia could compromise and negotiate (even though I think that is the result of a political leadership that is out of step with their mass base), but looking at social and economic factors on the ground would suggest more instability for some time to come.
ReplyDeleteI recently watched "The Square" (secret fact, you can watch it on Netflix even though it was just released), which is a documentary about the Egyptian revolution. The film is mostly centered around a few individuals who want a secular democratic future for Egypt. Then of course, there is a vote and the Muslim Brotherhood wins. The film ends just as Morsi steps down, so it feels like a hopeful ending for the seculars. On January 18, a few days ago, Egypt passed their new constitution with 98.1%. It has really similar parameters as the US Constitution, like a four-year presidential term and parliamentary impeachment powers. While the percentage seems really positive, there was major suppression of oppositional opinions in the lead up to the vote. I've been thinking that the conditions in which a constitution is created matter almost as much as the material inside the constitution itself. The most important thing is not that parameters exist, but that people AGREE on the parameters, right?
ReplyDeletehttp://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/19/world/middleeast/vote-validates-egypts-constitution-and-military-takeover.html
Yes, and I think it's important to think about what the Egyptians actually voted on. In theory, they voted on a constitution. In practice, I think it's fair to say they voted to end the chaos, because the military has reverted back to the old security discourse. The choice, as it was presented (and widely perceived), was between security and stability on the one hand, and continued insecurity and chaos on the other.
ReplyDeleteI'm doing research right now on the interplay of institutional and discursive frameworks and the implications for governance when political actors are operating with separate discursive frameworks, as sometimes (but not always) secular-liberal and Islamist actors do. At this point, I'm leaning towards making the claim that discursive framework is more important than institutional framework for 'good governance.' We can talk more about that in class too.
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DeleteThe chaotic aftermath of the Arab spring introduced lot of instability within the MENA region. Tunisia, on the other hand, seems to be the exception. Many of us believe Tunisia is successful democracy and are constantly cherishing this idea. However, this success is more illusional and relative than anything else. Yes, certainly Tunisia did relatively better than other countries but that does not mean it is enough to qualify the country as democratic. This country is dangerously fragmented. There is an undeniable socioeconomic fragmentation between thriving coastal cities and the rest of the developed cities; differences between westernized Tunisians and conservative Tunisians when it comes to beliefs, convictions, ideas, perspectives and the way they view the future of their country. Not only that but terrorism is also another major problem encountered currently, a problem that has worsened during the past years especially after the Libyan revolution: thousands and thousands of arms were stolen and fled from Libya to uncontrollable areas, destabilizing the neighbor countries such as Algeria and Tunisia. All of that to say, that the Tunisian revolution could be a successful democracy only if these problems are taking into consideration and solved. Only if Tunisians manage to put these differences aside and focus on what unifies them: the future of Tunisia..
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