Legitimacy of Rentier States

In class, we discussed the legitimacy of rentier and interventionist states. Because rentier states focus the bulk of their economy on only a few specific sources of income, it is important to see who is receiving the benefits of that income. In the Middle East, there isn't a large middle class. Most of the population is usually at one end of the spectrum or the other, rather than in between. The benefit of the rentier economy favors those at the high end of the spectrum, causing the gap between the two groups to grow wider.

Because there is such a dichotomy, I would say that this gap hurts the legitimacy of the state. One of the major examples would be the uprisings in 2011. Many youth were driven to protests because of the lack of basic rights, such as food or employment. In Bahrain, for example, Shiites quickly overtook the protests and added the sectarian angle, stating that Shiites were not as economically grounded as Sunnis and that they often lacked sufficient education and employment. In this case, the rentier economy benefits the government and its partners, rather than the population as a whole. Bahraini Shiites complained that they were being pushed out of employment in favor of foreign laborers, as it seemed that they had a larger share of the economy than actual Bahraini citizens.

This type of disconnect and disproportionate representation and access severely hurts a state's legitimacy. If the economy is seen as favoring one group or population over another, the state loses its legitimacy in the eyes of the people because it looks as if the rents are not being employed to serve the state as a whole. Because of this imbalance and the fact that the economy and the state are so closely tied together, it would seem as if rentier economies are less likely to experience legitimacy in the eyes of their population.

Rentier states: legitimacy and disconnect between state and citizens

I can not speak for the citizens of “rentier states” but I have given some thought to this subject. I also can't generalize due to the fact that there is quite a bit of variation between different regimes and their policies. In my opinion, the theory underestimates how certain levels of political stability, corruption, and foreign intervention would affect the perceived legitimacy of a given state. In the cases of Libya and Iraq – both of which continue to be failed states – it would be hard to believe that anyone has considered any of their regimes legitimate for many years, pre- or post-US involvement. However, within the GCC, oil rents have been used partly to actually strengthen certain aspects of their economies, not to mention large investments in infrastructure and education. Based on what I've read, many youth in the GCC and even in Iran are not necessarily looking to cause revolutionary change in their governments, but rather seeking gradual reforms. (Of course, many young Iranians are thoroughly disillusioned with their government, but perhaps grudgingly accept some level of legitimacy because they see no other realistic possibility of change.)

No matter how much a “rentier state” distributes its wealth to average citizens, one can easily find evidence of demands for more rights. Especially with increasingly educated populations who are tuned into the discrepancy between their rights and the rights given to citizens of other nations, the level/perception of legitimacy somehow might have begun to be less relevant than the ability to have one's government recognize certain rights and freedoms. And even “rentier states” that might not seem obligated to or concerned with answering the demands of their people have given in to some pressure for certain legal and other reforms, thereby increasing their legitimacy and narrowing the disconnect between state and citizens.

Rentier states and popular legitimacy

Rentier states are likely viewed as generally illegitimate by their citizens. If one is to take an economic approach to the concept, a rentier state implies a relationship of mutual benefit - citizens are provided for financially and the government expects them not to become a source of political challenge/contestation. The provision of rents is thus a fairly transparent substitute for the democratic concept of a social contract. When evaluating whether a rentier economy helps or hurts the problem of a disconnect between states it's important to identify the perspective from which we are conducting our evaluation. From a state's perspective, the connection with its citizens is strengthened because they are receiving government benefits which will likely be unavailable without the government as the distributor. The disconnect can also be exacerbated if states provide rents in a way that sectors of the population find to be unacceptable, such as in the case of Saudi Arabia. Even with this possibility in mind, a rentier economy benefits the state by, at the very least, buying it time to develop a resonant movement frame that will help it retain power if and when the rent-derived resource is not available. From the perspective of citizens, a rentier state may be legitimate only in that they respect the state out of fear for the consequences of not doing so. The price to pay for receiving rent benefits - political silence - will likely become more difficult to pay as social media has already created spaces for dissent that rentier and non-rentier states alike view as a threat.

On the issue of automatic assumptions

In response to Prof. Hardig's post "On the issue of automatic assumptions," the shooting over the weekend at a Texas Muhammad drawing contest is another example of the ways in which American media often portrays Muslims. Out of all of the coverage I've seen of the issue, none of it mentions the number of Muslims who peacefully protested and chose not to commit an act of violence (which I would venture to say is beyond the number of attackers who threatened the event). Second, news outlets are currently reporting that ISIS has claimed responsibility for the shooting, playing into the idea that the two men were somehow linked to the organization without any evidence thus far that they were other than the claim. While this possibility cannot yet be ruled out, it is also possible that ISIS has falsely taken responsibility for the attack in an effort to breed additional fear among Americans of attacks being carried out on U.S. soil, thereby enhancing its legitimacy as an organization that can execute a strike thousands of miles from its base. Reporting that ISIS has claimed responsibility without providing evidence of such, especially when mentioning the lack of evidence well after the headline, is an example of how American news media sometimes favor reporting expediency to the potential detriment of an accurate portrayal of events. I also found this phenomenon to be evident within the coverage of the Chapel Hill shooting; the notion that the man who killed the three students had committed a hate crime was pervasive and very little mainstream media coverage mentioned the fact that he had reportedly had problems with other non-Muslim neighbors in the past. It appears that in providing accurate and representative coverage of Muslims (as well as other minorities), American news media has its work cut out for itself.

Old Post: Strong vs. Weak States in MENA

The notion of ‘strong’ states versus ‘weak’ states requires some elucidation. What would you say is the correct characterization of the typical MENA state? In the study of MENA political dynamics (or political dynamics anywhere for that matter) what are the implications of differing conceptualizations of ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ states?


Though one of the key takeaways from the semester has been that painting all the states of MENA with such broad brush is highly problematic, if I were to generalize about state strength in MENA, I would characterize the region's states as "concentrated" but weak.

One must first acknowledge that the states of MENA exist on a wide spectrum.  While some states such as Libya and Syria have descended in chaos, others maintain relatively strong state institutions such as Saudi Arabia.

MENA states are 'strong' in the sense that many regimes use broad-reaching and often heavy-handed state institutions--especially the military--to control the population and maintain power. A typical example of this would be Syria, or arguably Egypt prior to the Arab revolts of 2011. With the military and the regime so closely intertwined the state apparatus is formidable and capable of exerting a great deal of influence in areas the government has a presence. However, some MENA states also seem to have trouble exerting this influence over their entire territory.  Though the large and sparsely populated area of some MENA states can partially account for this, semi-autonomous regions such a Kurdistan in Iraq, or the relatively independent Sinai, show some weakness for state apparati that could be considered overbearing to those living under their direct control.  In this way MENA states show characteristics of strength in areas that they definitively control, but are weak in the sense that many are unable to fully control all of the territory within their borders.

Gender in the MENA Region

Women tend to get the short end of the stick internationally. While there may be specific matriarchal cultures, overall nation-states are male-dominated and this tends to transcend into most cultural norms. However, it is very interesting the Western perspective we have of gender equality in the Middle East while there is still quite a bit of disparity present here stateside. 

The readings from this week cover the issues of gender equality in the MENA region. I believe both Western women and MENA region women face large challenges in gender equality but they are different styles of challenges. Tradition still plays a credible role in many rural areas in both the U.S. and MENA region. In these areas, women are often subjugated to stricter cultural norms that may constrain their ability to socially progress. In many rural MENA regions, women are expected to remain at home and fulfill their duty as a caregiver for both their families but in rural America, women are often also expected to behave a certain way. While there is more workforce mobilization available to women in the West, culturally women are also subjugated to unfair norms and institutions. Issues like abortion, marriage, birth-control etc are all highly contentious in the U.S. and conservative interpretations of these issues can severely constrict a woman's life, regardless of geographical location. 

The differences in challenges lay in the cultural and historical evolution of both areas. Even women in the United States and women in Western Europe differ in the amount of gender equality provided for them. Gender equality has progressed far more in certain aspects in Western Europe than it has in the U.S. due to the historical and cultural differences between the two. Without any deep research, one can see an obvious correlation between religiosity and gender equality- the U.S. and MENA region have deeply religious areas where women are treated differently and often restricted in their life choices in some way while Europe, a region with far less religiosity, offers more gender equality. 

Follow Up to Discussion of "Garbage Dreams"

Hands Along the Nile, the non-profit I interned for earlier this semester, does a lot of work with Egypt's Zabbaleen community. After watching the film, we talked in class about sustainability and how the community is going to have to adapt in the face of competition with larger contractors. When my supervisor was in Egypt earlier this year, she met a few of the people HANDS is working with in the Zabbaleen community and wrote a newsletter about one man in particular. Based on our discussion, I thought you all might be interested to see how this particular company is adapting/growing:

http://myemail.constantcontact.com/Eissa-s-Brave-Decision.html?soid=1110322785557&aid=tlgC6pmI6g8

Old Post: On Rentier States

"Do you think a rentier state is more or less legitimate in the eyes of its citizens? In other words, does a rentier economy help or hurt the problem of a disconnect between state and citizens? Provide a clear rationale for your argument. "

As posed in the question, the legitimacy of rentier states, and the rentier economies that underpin them, must be considered relative to other types of states. An argument that rentier states have more legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry than democratic states, where the will of the people is directly reflected in government, seems tenuous at best.  Both types of states attempt to satisfy the general populous, but through different means.  Democratic states seek to satisfy citizens with popular policies and sound decision-making.  While the quality of life of a state's citizens certainly impacts the legitimacy and popularity of democratic regimes, the relationship between social welfare and regime survival is far more direct in rentier states.

Still, when one considers other forms of autocratic states, such as those that derive their legitimacy strictly through heredity or the threat of military force, rentier states probably experience less of a disconnect between the state and its citizens. By transferring the wealth gained through rents--typically oil-derived in MENA--to the people, the regime essentially adopts a policy of appeasement, maintaining and improving quality of life. Should the regime fail to continue this sort of "social contract," it may face increased civil unrest and potential regime change. This means that rentier states must remain cognizant and--at least to some degree--responsive to the desires of the citizenry.  Though this may not amount to democratic "legitimacy" as it is commonly understood today or in the eyes of the international community, the need to improve or maintain quality of life alleviates at least some of the disconnect between state and citizen.

The Palestinian Intifada as a non-violent movment

In my view, the Palestinian Intifada in 1990s was a turning point in the Palestinian liberation movement. After decades of armed struggles that involved not only a lot of causalities but also political sacrifices. This Intifada has bring the Palestinian Issue once again to the forefront of the world politics. But before trying to recognize the outcomes of this brave movement, we should also realize the regional and the international political realities. 

I think there was three main elements that helped in the break out of the Intifada; first after decades of armed struggle the Palestinians found themselves losing more land to Israel due to the huge imbalance of power. It is worth noticing that, the armed struggle has been always coming from outside and therefore subject to all the vicissitudes of the regional political calculations. Palestinian have paid very high price in regards to their leaders calculations (or more precisely miscalculations) when it comes to use force against the Israelis. Massacres happened in Jordon in 1970 and in Lebanon in the Lebanese civil war.  Second, the regional political landscape has changed dramatically in the Middle East after the Iraqi invasion to Kuwait and the backlash that caused on the Palestinian people and the Palestinian issue.  There was a shift in the Arab politics as result to the rift that the invasion caused. Consequently, the Palestinian Issue lost its position as the central issues of all Arabs from the Gulf to the Atlantic. Third, the decade of the 1990s started with the fall of Berlin wall and the disintegration of the Soviet Union with all its ramifications and implications on the Arab world. The US has come out of the Cold War as the singular world super power. Undoubtedly, all those factors played an important role in mobilizing the people who suffered the most under the Israeli occupation towards the uprising and demanding by themselves their legitimate rights of self-government and elimination of the 5 decades long of occupation.

The Palestinian Intifada has succeeded tremendously in achieving the Oslo accords. Nevertheless, the consequent reconciliation itself was not up to the aspirations of Palestinians nor their legitimate rights. Which leaded to the establishment of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) and the declining of the influence of the PLO. 

Palestinian Success

Non-violent struggle for change is not easy. And it becomes even harder when the population you are struggling against has no qualms about using highly violent measures. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is multifaceted, with many outside players, so it is no surprise that the solution would be just as complicated. When I first read the question, my immediate response was that the intifada didn't achieve anything and Palestinians are in same place, if not a worse place. But then I went back to look at what was known at the time that he wrote the article (1999) and what happened following the intifada. What I found shifted my perspective somewhat. In the long run, the intifada was not successful in achieving the goals that the Palestinians set, however, that does not mean it wasn't successful in a different way. During that period of time, the Palestinians and Israelis did not communicate or have any kind of relationship. Palestinians were trying to survive and while Israelis were attempting to take and keep all that they could. It can be argued that the intifada lead to the 1993 Agreement, which was the first of its kind. Palestinians used a non-violent approach and it did have an effect on the situation. During that time, it could be considered a MAJOR achievement. Especially to a people who felt they had no voice. Today, we may have different view, and the situation did deteriorate after that point, but that doesn't negate the fact that they tried a different approach and there is evidence of it working.

Secular vs. Religious

To determine whether or not the MENA region is secular or religious, depends on what lens you are viewing the Middle East. You have to consider more than just the elections. When Edward Said spoke about the mood of Arab world being secular, he wasn't viewing the Middle East through an Orientalist framework or connotation, as it is often viewed from the west. From the outside looking in it can easily be said the Middle East is religious. The majority of elected officials are of some religious affiliated group, when the media shows images of the MENA the woman are often a burka or hijab (a reminder that most people practice Islam), and every other news articles mention religious groups taking action.  With the West being of a very Judo-Christian tradition, images and mention of Islam triggers an immediate response in people, that religion is a part of every part of life including the political system. From that view-point, yes, the Elections solidify the belief that the MENA region is religious.

However, if viewing the Elections from a different perspective or lens, the opposite conclusion can be derived. With the elections of 2011, more often than not, people voted for the person they were more familiar with. Civil society in many MENA regions, look to their government for their basic needs to be met: health care, education, security, etc. When the government fails in its duties to the people, the people turn to those who can provide, whether those entities have religious affiliations or not. In turn, when the groups that have supported the community run for political office, they are the one who people vote for. It is not necessarily a vote for the Muslim/Religious candidate, but a vote for a candidate who has shown that they care about the needs of community. Governments have sometimes used religion as tool to relate to the people or as a uniting characteristic. However, oft times they are using it for secular reasons, to further a secular government.

Non-Violent Social Movements: the First Palestinian Intifada

Better late than never...hopefully! I had this 90% done a week ago and put it on hold because the readings are dated and needed to catch up on more recent news, which I mention at the end...

What I had before:
While re-reading the Zunes chapter, I'm realizing that the fact that the success of the Druze nonviolent resistance to Israeli soldiers inspired the Palestinians just before the first Intifada is remarkable, as is the breakdown in the morale and discipline of the soldiers when confronted with the nonviolent action of the population. The logic of nonviolence is that when a military force does not have a recognizable force against which to push back, it becomes much easier to redirect the energy and take them off balance (i.e., breakdown of morale). (The physical analogy to the martial art of aikido occurred to me the second time I read this, just before noticing the author's similar analogy to jujitsu!) Further, as the reading suggests, when lacking the threat of violent resistance, the purpose of military troops becomes questionable (at the very least) to the point of being unjustifiable. Similarly, violent resistance is quite a desired reaction for those wishing to justify a military occupation. So at first, the first Intifada had positive effects: greater international awareness and recognition of the PLO and Palestinian self-determination within just the first year. But as time went on, the PA would only control politics while Israel continued to control the land, and the nonviolent resistance movement became stuck; they felt the need for "stronger" resistance.

Dajani really explored the effects of the first Intifada on the Palestinian psyche: feelings of both empowerment and frustration. They were constantly re-evaluating actions, objectives, and priorities and perhaps didn't have the patience to see through the nonviolent struggle. I can't say I blame them, considering that, by now, all Palestinians have lived their entire lifetimes under occupation. The fact that they ended up reacting more than strategizing naturally led to difficulty in maintaining unity. The overall lack of political progress exacerbated the infighting and acts of violence from certain groups/individuals (unsurprisingly, women and their public demands were used as scapegoats for any defeats). It's easy to see how Palestinians have felt demoralized by the brutality of ongoing Israeli repression and the neglect (for the most part) of the international community in supporting their cause.

As for the Intifada's effects on the Israeli people: some people realized that repressing the Palestinians was both wrong and detrimental to their security, while others became more convinced that the occupation should be enforced at any cost. It's the usual divide between people who have empathy and/or common sense, and people who somehow think that war can lead to peace, or else don't care about peace as long as they have a lot of military protection. Unfortunately, increasingly violent/separating measures between the Israeli military and Palestinians apparently kept the outrage from having too strong an impact on the Israeli public.

What is also unfortunate is that whatever effect the Intifada had seems to have almost completely faded between Israel and Palestine. From the 51-day war last summer that destroyed thousands of homes and killed hundreds of civilians to Netanyahu's recent re-election and incessant war rallying to Hamas and other armed groups having to turn away recruits due to the higher-than-ever unemployment and outrage over the death and destruction...it's hard to see a nonviolent future. The increased insecurity in the region has only, undoubtedly, added to the justification of keeping a firm "iron first" over the Palestinian territories. And, apparently, the extra land and power seem to be worth the security risk of uprisings. After years of failed violent uprisings and years of largely nonviolent uprisings that did not manage to reach a tipping point or enough of a political effect or enough international support...again, I can not blame Palestinians for reacting violently after all that they have lost, my pacifism aside.

One piece of surprising recent news I came across is that Palestinian doctors are now allowed to drive to work in Jerusalem, for the first time since 2000. Also, Palestinians over the age of 50 received relaxed permitting, and businessmen might also experience more freedom of movement. Of course, any of this could change at any time.

Characteristics of the First Intifada

Although the Palestinians realized that their strength came from mass civil disobedience in the form of boycotting Israeli goods, denying tax collections and organizing unarmed confrontations in the First Intifada, Israel was very successful to play both the victim and justified arbitrator of the occupied territories.   

As Dajani points out, Israel successfully broke down any power that the Palestinian popular committees worked towards using “divide and rule” tactics such as massive tax raids and travel bans against communities that stood out against the occupation.  There were paid collaborators that worked on behalf of Israel to infiltrate the Palestinian community and would identify the activists who would become “the victims of Israeli death squads.”  The Palestinians were also disillusioned with the Arab leadership in general because of Israeli overview, and the PLO in particular, which they felt had not come to their aid or worked toward their independence.   

Violence that was attributed to the First Intifada was not solely attributed to the Israeli government.  Although the root of the problem goes back to Israel conquering the occupied territories in the 1967 six day war, the tensions that mounted during the First Intifada had a self-destructive effect from within Palestinian Communities which then transitioned to a rebirth of identity that gained international recognition in the years that followed.  The internal struggle of conflict between Palestinians loyal to the calls for freedom and those who collaborated with the Israeli forces resulted in around 1,000 casualties compared to the 1,100 estimated Palestinians killed directly by Israeli forces.     

Overall, the First Intifada was successful in that it unified a national identity and structured a plan for future change.  Many groups that organized in the Intifada had the end goal of a two state solution; however they realized that focusing on more specific rights first would create a sense of change that the masses could get behind. 

Israel's dark future.. Democracy in the Jewish state is doomed

As once We mentioned the Israel's democracy in the class. I think this one is a good read!
http://www.vox.com/2015/4/13/8390387/israel-dark-future

Secularism in the Middle East

In response to: Do the electoral results in Egypt and Tunisia post-2011 support a claim that people are particularly religious in the MENA region? Has Edward Said, who once said he felt the “predominant mood of the Arab world is very secular,” been proven wrong?

Immediately after the Arab Spring, Mohammed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood was elected to the presidency in Egypt, and the Islamic democrat party Ennahda was elected to govern Tunisia. However, although the Arab populations of Egypt and Tunisia are predominantly Muslim, the political climate tends to be secular.

The trend in the Middle East, including Egypt and Tunisia, seems to be that Arabs will elect more Islamic governments in times of crisis. Wickham and Dajani both note that the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas were well liked because they provided a measure of stability and “support, food, [and] medical care” in the community (Dajani 57). This might be because the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas both make an active effort to be present in their communities, more so than other government parties.

In a region often plagued by instability, these rigid governments offer some sort of security. Especially considering the upheaval surrounding the Arab Spring, consistency would have been attractive to voters. In addition, one of the driving forces of the Arab Spring was the lack of employment for young, often well educated, Arabs. In Tunisia, now that the crisis has passed, the population has chosen to move back to a secular government. Egypt’s choice to get rid of Morsi was also rooted in economic circumstances, but for different reasons. The situation for Egyptian youth has remained fairly stagnant, with many in the population still unable to find work or feed their families.

In the end, I would say that although the MENA region is very religious, the populations’ choices concerning their governments is very rooted in the economic and political circumstances at the time of elections, rather than their religious convictions.

Non-violence and the Palestinian Intifada

In response to: As you know by now, 'non-violent' struggle is not about sitting around in circles singing Kumbaya. Quite the contrary, it's a highly strategic enterprise that usually entails significant risks to personal safety for those who take part. Zunes gives several examples of non-violent struggle in the MENA region while Dajani discusses the effectiveness of non-violent resistance in the first Palestinian Intifada. As we know twenty-five years later, the Intifada didn't lead to a resolution of the conflict. What did it achieve, if anything? What impact did it have on both the Palestinian and Israeli societies?

Twenty-five years later, the Intifada does not seem to have achieved anything. Rather, it seems to have widened the chasm between Israeli and Palestinian societies. Although Zunes seemed to find the intifada in Palestine a success, Dajani openly admitted that “adherence to nonviolent methods was never totally uniform nor disciplined” (63). This lack of consistency, caused by frustration, hurt the Palestinian cause, leading to today’s downward spiral.

If anything, it would seem that the intifada has left a negative legacy. Dajani states, “Palestinians have themselves contributed to the widening social distance by using more violent methods in their attacks against Israelis. Ultimately, the indiscriminate and deliberate force used against Palestinians by Israeli soldiers and police created a situation of mutual hatred and distrust” (61). “Indiscriminate” perfectly describes how Israelis act toward Palestinians today. If Hamas or other terrorist organizations attack Israelis, the Israeli soldiers often respond by attacking the Palestinian community as a whole. Photojournalist Dick Doughty, in his book Gaza: A Legacy of Occupation, recounts the crackdowns on the Palestinian community after attacks on Israeli soldiers. Palestinians are prevented from going to work, must deal with early curfews, are subjected to late night searches, and often lose their homes to bombing attacks. The small pockets of Palestinians that use force reap repercussions for the entire Palestinian community, leading to a vicious cycle of attacks on Israeli soldiers and Israeli retaliation against innocent Palestinians.

This obviously oversimplifies the conflict, as there are several other mitigating factors. However, as Dajani points out, consistency and discriminate action would go a long way in providing a more positive impact on Israel and Palestine.

The Palestinian Intifada

It is very obvious that the Palestinian intifada was unsuccessful in achieving its goal of ending Israeli occupation. However, the movement was also successful in other regards. In my opinion, the most significant contribution the intifada made was changing the perception of the Palestinian independence struggle. The contrast of these non-violent Palestinian protesters against armed Israeli security forces, spoke volumes. As Dajani puts it, these scenes helped "change the image of Palestinians from `terrorists' to a people with a legitimate national cause. (59, Dajani) This shifting in perception affected not only regional actors but the entire world viewed the Palestinian struggle through new eyes. There were a few joint movements that came out of this, positive developments but unfortunately nothing intensely concrete.

The intifada movement also had significant impact on both Palestinian and Israeli society. To start with, in Palestine the movement acted as a important unification tool. Palestinian society banded together in this movement, large-scale strikes were organized whose success depended on widespread participation.While initially successful in gaining support, the movement evolved over time. Due to the situation, the Palestinian resistors constantly needed to change their approach in order to most effectively resist the latest challenges. While this encouraged innovative approaches, it also was a major source of frustration and demoralization for participants. With the situation constantly changing, it also made it far more difficult to determine if any progress was being made in protesting the Israeli occupation. Naturally, this can cause a curb in motivation for the everyday resistor. The intifada was a marathon movement and sustaining it for such a long time period proved problematic.

Palestine's non-violent approach to Israel's occupation created a difficult set of circumstances for Israeli government and military officials. Firstly, armed troops against peaceful protesters automatically portrayed Israel in a negative light. Secondly, without the obvious motivator Palestinian violence, it was much more difficult to explain Israel's use of force and for it to justify itself the the global community. Individual Israeli soldiers requested being placed in different duty stations other than the Occupied Territories in order to avoid the situation there and its moral implications. Initially, the intifada also had the positive effect of polarizing Israeli society into supporters of Palestinian protesters and those against, but over time, this effect has dissipated. As mentioned earlier, cross-border groups sprung out of the intifada but there was little sizable impact.

The most significant contribution of the intifada is its success in altering global perception of the Israeli occupation and the oppressed Palestinian population. This is an ongoing struggle which will continue to play out on the world stage with international effects.

Secularism in the MENA Region

In response to the question regarding the levels of religiosity in the MENA region, I believe one has to recognize the fact that religion offers not only an outlet for devotion but also acts as a significant contributor to civil society in the area. As we discussed in class, numerous civil society groups foster deep communal relations through their various charitable organizations. This means that religious groups gain a strong base of support and can utilize this support when necessary. Now to loop back to the question itself, I feel that the answer is that- the people might not be particularly religious but the fact that religious organizations are the ones promoting democratic options or calling for change, means that it is these groups that capture popular support. As many of my peers have written, the support for these groups is not an indicator of overall religiosity but rather an indicator for which groups have been able to establish successful community ties and offer alternatives to regimes. Another oft-reiterated fact that we have discussed in this course, is how divergent the individual states of the MENA region are. Examining the religious evolution of particular states would give a better idea of how the region has changed since Said made his statements.

The fact that so many civil society organizations have religious undertones may make it seem that there has been a significant spike in religiosity in the MENA region. In reality, when one examines this in depth, it's far more complex.

A secular mood?

At last, after a weekend full of disruption, I can organize my thoughts...better late than never, I'm hoping!

Edward Said began his professorial career in the 1960s and his most famous writings were in the 1970s. Assuming that he made that statement before 1975, it would have been a logical observation to make. Religion was mostly kept in the private sphere throughout the Middle East, including Iran, Lebanon had not yet erupted into (partly religiously motivated) civil war, the First Intifada of the Palestinians (which began in 1987 and which quickly led to the formation of the militant Islamic group Hamas) had not yet begun, the Muslim Brotherhood had not yet gained popularity as an unofficial political party (as they would begin to in the 1980s), and Algeria's Islamic parties were far from rising to national politics (as they did in the 1990s).

The Owen chapter mentions the historical dynamics of post-colonial land reform across many parts of the Middle East, such as in Egypt. The power and land was taken away from the rural landowners. Additionally, labor unions - which were such a powerful force during the era of independence, nationalism, and state-building - also began to lose much of their power as the state began to grow suspicious of them, desiring to keep their power in check. I would argue (and I think I've seen somewhere in previous readings something to this effect) that the loss of these two sources of power might have shifted some of that power to mosques, clergy, and religious groups. Because the majority of the population has associated with Islam, the government could not fight it and chose to also associate itself with Islam whenever convenient, both to stay in control and also to convince the population of its legitimacy.

Certain dynamics also lead to a less secular population: sustained persecution and/or alienation of a population - either externally or internally - leads to mobilization of more and more of the population, and that includes religious groups that previously remained in the local and/or private sphere; the fatigue and frustration over the "old guard" and corruption, especially in Tunisia and Egypt; the growing number of educated middle/lower-middle class youth who were seduced by the alternative ideologies of Islamic groups that seemed to address their concerns and needs; and perhaps the 1990s and the sudden growth of Western NGOs - in general, and specifically in the Middle East. I wonder if this NGO dynamic could have helped provide a framework for the religious groups? Or possibly could have added to the backlash against all things "Western"?

As for Tunisia and Egypt, their "semi-open" political systems allowed for mass mobilization and politicization of various groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. The Brotherhood in Egypt, in particular, built itself so organically and steadily in such an organized manner that gained the respect of first those on the "periphery", then certain youth, then various professional organizations (sometimes through the same previous youth) and finally gained some political power. So it may seem that the general and political mood became less secular. However, as Rosefsky Wickham points out, people overwhelmingly believed that the Muslim Brotherhood was simply an honest and trustworthy organization that could reform corrupt, unresponsive, and entrenched elites and political leaders - rather than focusing on the group's goals of implementing some form of Islamic law.

I believe that the success of Islamic groups in Tunisia's and Egypt's post-2011 elections have been indications of free and fair elections. Suppressing these groups would only lead to backlash and possible radicalization, a further sense of alienation from all things "Western" and the troublesome assumption that democratization is intrinsically anti-Islamic. On the other hand, many have expressed concern over the risk of losing the same democratic freedoms that have allowed Islamic groups the chance for political success in the first place.

In sum, Edward Said might not have been completely proven wrong, but there is no simple answer to this considering that the mood in each country is different, each society is divided into secular elites and many other groups, and the dynamics continue to shift throughout the years and regimes.

Non-Violent Movements & the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict

The First Intifada was a Palestinian uprising against Israeli occupation as a non-violent movement of unarmed resistance and civil disobedience. Ultimately, the end of the intifada was characterized by a failure to achieve Palestinian independence, as the occupation remained intact and Israel’s control of the Occupied Territories was reinforced through economic and political restraints. However, the Intifada’s non-violent social movement did leave a lasting impact by altering and reordering the social relationships and dynamics in both Palestine and Israel.

The Intifada changed societal relationships in Palestine by (1) creating divisions and factions within society, (2) defining the role of women in the national struggle, and lastly, (3) establishing the local committees, grassroots movements, and political spheres going into the future. Firstly, in terms of pitting factions and sections of society against each other, one major consequence of the intifada was the emergence of Hamas and political Islam. According to Souad Dajani, Hamas gained many supporters “because it was able to meet the needs of many residents for support, food, medical care and the like” (p. 57). Specifically, they offered a compelling message, especially in “view of the perceived failure of the secular PLO to achieve any political gains,” and prevented themselves as an alternative to the ineffective Palestinian Authority that was achieved after the end of the First Intifada (Id.). Their appeal to tradition resonated among the demoralized Palestinian population and Hamas was able to subsequently democratize and concentrate strategies for “the construction of the institutions and agencies of the forthcoming Palestinian state” (Id.). Secondly, the intifada clarified and shed light on the role of women in Palestinian society. Palestinian women have almost always been very active in the national movement but the Intifada increased the extent to which they were involved through political participation. Dajani mentions a new political self-consciousness by women and the “questioning of their role in the national struggle” and the public voicing of their desire to create a “separate women’s agenda beyond the goals of the overall” movement. Palestinian women began to view themselves as a feminist segment of a larger Palestinian society, which drew criticism from many as they perceived the feminism as a departure from tradition and religion by many. Thirdly, local and popular committees proliferated into ever widening spheres of the Palestinian community, organized grassroots movements, and determined the Intifada’s strategies. Thus, these public committees set the stage for how political discourse, resistance, and decision-making would develop going forward.

The intifada also changed social relationships in Israel with regards to three segments of Israeli society: (1) the public, (2) the government and (3) the Army. Dajani asserts that the intifada resulted in clear “lines between different poles in Israeli society” with regards to the Palestine issue (p. 63). The Israeli public was split into a division between staunch Zionist groups in favor of harsh repression of Palestinians and Israeli peace movements that were critical of the violence. This split was centered on the emergence of new assumptions about the relationship between security and peace, with the Left dissenting to excessive Israeli force and the Right supporting any measures necessary to protect the safety of the Israeli population. The Intifada altered the public perception of Palestinians in Israel by widening the social distance between the occupied and their occupiers (p. 61). Secondly, the intifada allowed for a conservative political agenda which would come to dominate and polarize the Israeli government. The Intifada occurred during the rule of Yitzhak Rabin’s “moderate” government, which still responded with indiscriminate force to uprisings. This dangerous precedent by centrist governments opened the room for more conservative platforms and policies like that of Likud and Netanyahu to easily and brutally oppress non-violent movements twenty-five years since the Intifada. Thirdly, the Intifada affected the relationship between the Israeli army and the Israeli community. The costs to the military were mostly moral. Morally, the IDF was met with much resentment internationally and even within Israel as people questioned the army’s excessive violence through political participation. On the other hand, the lack of empathy for the Palestinians was growing among both the general public and the Army and there was in fact a strong mutual hatred  ofshared by both the Army and the majority of the general public.

Nonviolence in Israel/Palestine

Israel-Palestine is a challenging case because of all of the outside forces and interests playing out in this tiny strip of land. Nonviolent resistance continues to play a dominant role in the discussion around how to address the military occupation of the West Bank in a way that demands Israel change its current policies. The two Intifadas that have occurred in the region were distinctly different. Intifada, or 'shaking off', is an attempt by the Palestinians to end Israeli control of their land. 

The first Intifada was largely nonviolent. There were cases of violence, but for the most part this was not the norm. It is important to note that one of the challenges to characterizing certain actions as nonviolent is that both parties don't always agree on what nonviolence is or looks like. Palestinians view rock throwing as nonviolent. After all, a tank or gun versus a rock is hardly a fair fight. However, Israelis see this as a violent act that can cause harm to civilians and military personnel. The great success of this intifada was that it led to the start of the Oslo accords. While, these agreements in and of themselves did not ultimately result in Palestinian independence, they were a step towards peace that must be recognized. 

The second intifada, was much more violent than the first. Suicide bombs were a large issue which is why Israel states it started building the security barrier. There were also clashes between Israelis and Palestinians. 

The reason both of the Intifadas is important is because the type of conflict has shaped how the international community views the actors involved. It also shapes how Israelis and Palestinians view each other. Israelis live largely isolated from Palestinians. They do not have to interact with Palestinians on a regular basis, other than during their military service, and so many don't. Palestinians, as a result of living under occupation, do spend more time around Israelis. But the power differential between the two is so extreme that the relationship is typically damaged from the start and most interactions are out of necessity.  

There are a few Palestinian organizations doing nonviolent resistance to the occupation. One of their challenges is that depending on their tactics, they can be accused of being normalizers by those in their own community. This can be a damaging reputation that hinders their work. Palestinians are growing increasingly frustrated with the lack of results (i.e. statehood) and can see nonviolent resistance as a copout to stronger forms of resistance. 

Israelis, on the other hand, are largely afraid of Palestinians. They do not have to interact frequently, and live in fear that the second intifada will become their reality again. Nonviolence would be a better option from their perspective because it takes away some of the fear.  As the hegemonic power, however, they are not responsive to nonviolent resistance from within and have to have more international pressure. 

For example, one of the still emerging forms of nonviolent action in the region is the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions movement. I say emerging not because it hasn't been active, but because it is not yet effective. The movement itself has no clear direction and the level of boycott varies widely making the message inconclusive. Are you boycotting the state of Israel or the Israeli military occupation of Palestine? Without direction, even a well-intentioned nonviolent movement that has great potential can be limited and ineffective. In my view, it is better to highlight a boycott of settlement products since the military occupation and illegal settlements are the main issue. 

Secular or Religious MENA?

Religion plays an important role in the Middle East, but it is important to distinguish religious conviction from voting for religious parties. The Muslim Brotherhood gained a great deal of popularity in Egypt because of their previous work in civil society. Economics can be equally as important as a motivator as political power. 

For example, in Tahrir Square and Avenue Bourguiba, "Bread, Freedom, and Social Justice" was the cry of the protestors. Additionally, and 2010 survey of Arab youth shows that the top two priorities for Arab youth were the cost of living and the high levels of unemployment. Both of these are indicators that  the political will of the people will pursue those in power that can meet these needs. Religion was not the main talking point. However, just months later, the Muslim Brotherhood took an overwhelming number of seats. This was not a cry for Islamist power, but a choice for a government that the people believed would be responsive to their needs. 

The elections, in my view, have less of an indicator on secular vs. religious and more of a insight into the economic needs and desires of the people. A true evaluation of the level of "religiousness" or not of MENA, apart from these elections, would arguably be more regional. Better evaluations would be an examination of individuals states. For example, Saudi Arabia as more religious than Lebanon, but why and for what reason? Also, there appears to be a rural-urban split in levels of "religiousness." Examining why rural areas tend to be more religious than urban would also be a fair evaluation. Political parties less so. Therefore, I tend to think Said is still more or less right. 

Overall, states and  cities in MENA, continue to be secular. Political powers that do use religious jargon appear to do so more as a rallying cry or rhetoric. At the end of the day, they are pushing back against the West, whose history of colonialism leaves a distaste in the mouths of many Arabs for anything that is similar. This is when a dislike for things which are labeled secular becomes most clear. But at the end of the day, the political topics and desires of the people are not more religious. They are just, in some cases, more religiously labeled. But now that we have seen the overthrow of the MB and the crackdown of Sisi in Eygypt, that trend may also change. 

Civil and Secular State in MENA

I believe that, one of the reasons why there are divergences on the views regarding the Middle East politics is the definition of terminologies. Secularism is a term that has bad reputation in the MENA region as it may means Anti-religion for wide sectors of their societies. However, the same very regimes that are secular avoid using the word. After the Arab revolts in Egypt and Tunisia, the secular parties in their populist propaganda, especially against the Isalmist parties describe themselves as civic parties (Madani in Arabic) . Those parties expressed their aspiration to establish a “civil” state. The word “civil” and “civic” are used to refer to state that not governed by the religious law or religious groups. 

On the other hand, Muslim Brotherhood used the same word ‘civil’ as to defend them from the stigma of theocracy. Their definition to the ‘civil state” is a state that not run by the military where all citizens are equal regardless of their faiths. Nevertheless they assert that the state should be based on the Islamic civilization principles and the sharia as the ultimate reference to all.

The above shows a little bit of the MENA mood in regard to secularism. While Egypt was an elusively secular state over the past century, Tunisia was clearer about the nature of the state. Proximity to Europe and the small number of Population with no religious minority like Egypt makes the battle for the religious identity of the society less controversial.

The interesting thing about the Arab Spring is that, it has uncovered almost all the contradictions in the Arab world and exposes them to the severest of test.  The results of the elections in both countries  can tell us two contradictory things; the societies as described by Edward Said that, “predominant mood of the Arab world is very secular,” only if we think secularism is the separation of the clergy from the State. And ironically it could also say that the Arab world is very anti-secularist if we understand secularism as anti-religion.

In an article wrote by Peter Hill says, “But “madani” can also mean “civil” as opposed to “religious” or “Islamic.” In this sense madani is often employed as a kind of euphemism for “secular,” used in lieu of ‘almani, a word that most literally translates as “secular” but which often carries a more negative connotation. This distinction is best illustrated in an example given by Anwar Mughith, a secularist, columnist, and philosophy professor at Helwan University: “On a television program, a guest was talking about the characteristics we want for the Egyptian state in the coming period: he mentioned the equality of all before the law and the absence of discrimination between men and women or Muslims and Copts. Then he ended by saying, ‘We want a secular (‘almani) state.’ At this point those around him… shouted, ‘No, not ‘secular’ (‘almani), let’s call it a civil (madani) state.’”

Madani indicates a more neutral and acceptable area of the non-religious, whereas ‘almani tends to take on a more militantly anti-religious meaning. The audience in the Egyptian television program instantly understood that “secular” was a far more contentious term than “civil,” and that the latter embodied a vision of an inclusive form of government where all are equal before the law.

This dynamic reflects the continuing authority of the religious in Egyptian public life – in Egypt, it is far more acceptable to talk of a “civil” sphere, which exists alongside religion, than of a “secular” one that excludes or opposes it.

you can also look at the article here:

http://muftah.org/the-civil-and-the-secular-in-contemporary-arab-politics/#.VSAXsVy4l-U