The Military and the State

I find the readings this week to shed an interesting light on the relationship between the military and the state. Since the fall of the Ottoman Empire, there has been what seems a perpetual state of conflict in the Middle East region. Many types of conflicts have occurred from internal to external, border skirmishes, civil wars, and invasions. This obviously impacts the state of the military. Additionally, many countries are either ruled by the military or their leaders are/were in the military.

All states in the region have been affected by conflict and much of this is seen in their relationship to their militaries. They built up militaries to protect their new borders. The constant and lingering threat of conflict, however, sustained the acceptance of a big military. Further, Owen argues that the intensity of the conflicts keeps the military in power. In a time of calm and peace, the general population and leaders would not accept the military ruling over all aspects of life. They would see it as intrusive and unnecessary. However, a state that is not only under constant threat but familiar with intense conflict will excuse an overbearing military in exchange for a sense of security. In fact, security in many states (not just in the Middle East) is a term that seems to need no further explanation and justifies all measures. For these reasons, military downsizing has never been considered as threat has not gone away, real or perceived.

I wonder then in this explanation where the line is between experiencing real threat and the idea of Tilly's manufactured threat. It would seem that a country that has experienced several intense conflicts would be easily persuaded of new threats even if they are somewhat exaggerated to legitimize some government action. In other words, a country of people familiar with the feeling of fear would be easier to convince that some measure is necessary in order to protect them (referring back to Tilly).

Bread and Circuses

As has been previously discussed in the posts of my colleagues, there are significant challenges for rentier states. I think what is interesting in the Middle East is that countries that are resource rich, particularly with oil, in some cases then use the money received for this resource to pacify the citizens of the state. This concept itself reminds me of the "bread and circuses" strategy used by the Roman Empire around 100 AD. The challenge with this is that it is unsustainable. Saudi Arabia is, of course, our best Middle Eastern example because of how clearly this strategy plays out with the people through their system of economics, education, health services, etc. What I do think is interesting is that for the people who are receiving these services, the state is seen as very legitimate. Now, the services are not given equally to all citizens so those not receiving them have very different feelings toward the state. While the state can maintain these services, at least a portion of the population will remain loyal and view them as legitimate. However, when the oil runs out and the economy has not developed in other ways, the services will go and I anticipate the people will quickly become disloyal to the state. 

Rentier States

The issue of rentier states is prevalent in Middle Eastern studies. Rentier states are defined as those that derive a substantial or majority of their income from natural resource export to outside powers. In the Middle East, the vast majority of rentier states are those that rely on oil income. For example, Saudi Arabia has little indigenous resources besides oil. However, the presence of these vast oil reserves has catapulted it to extreme global importance and has transformed it into a wealthy nation with many wealthy individuals in its population. In this regard, being a rentier state helps bridge the disconnect inherent between the state and society in many nations. Many Middle Eastern nations use the income appropriated from rentier-ism to provide subsidies on facets of public life such as education, energy, healthcare, and infrastructure in an attempt to placate the masses and keeping them happy despite fierce restrictions on human rights. In this regard, being a wealthy rentier state helps bridge the gap between the state and the populace inherent in many nations in the MENA region. Having said that, however, this solution is not a sustainable one as oil and natural gas are quickly running out. As future supplies dwindle and global demand increases, these states may encounter difficulty in sustaining this rentier-subsidy based governmental model. Furthermore, the vast majority of the wealth extracted from being a rentier state is appropriated by the wealthier echelon of the population and the government. This creates a large income gap in the respective societies, which may fuel discontent among the masses. The rentier model is neither sustainable nor effective at the overall placation of the public due to increasing income gap and dwindling supplies.

Weak vs. Strong State:

Due to the diversity of the MENA region it is difficult to label the region as either strong or weak. In my opinion, strength of a state is defined as the ability of a government to possess territorial control and a strong legitimacy both at the international and national level; the ability to provide its citizens with a secure environment, a functioning legal system to bring justice, and finally a functioning economy that gives equal job opportunities for individuals. With this being said, I think weak and fragile states are easier to be described than strong states. Because, from a Realist point of view, one could also argue that a strong state could still struggle with unemployment and encounter economic inconsistencies as long as it accumulates enough military power over other states. In other words, the definition of a strong state is debatable. 

Weak states, on the other hand, are defined as the inability of any governments to ensure a stable economic and political atmosphere. Not only that, but we also speak of weak states whenever a government fails to take control of certain areas of its own country, which could represent a potential threat especially with the rise of terrorism threat. 

Now, if we were to apply this to the MENA region, I believe that Saudi Arabia, Qatar and UAE could qualify as strong states because they both have strong legitimacy nationally and internationally. They have strong relations with the west and are blessed with natural resources to buy stability in their own countries. Algeria, is another country blessed with natural resources and has been able to buy stability and avoid social upheaval thanks to this advantage. However, and due to the aftermath of the Arab Spring, Algeria become more of a fragile state rather than a strong state. As the neighboring countries, such as Libya and Tunisia, continue to suffer from terrorism, the Algerian borders are becoming very fragile. Despite of the strong military equipment and expertise Algeria has when it comes to fighting terrorism, the country could easily experience another wave of instability. 

As for the post-revolutionary countries such as Egypt and Tunisia, I believe they have the opportunity to become well-governed, prosperous democratic (and thus strong) states, but for now they are just fragile and weak states. Libya, on the other hand, is a failed state along with Yemen.

Lebanon and Jordan have complex border issues that became more complex with the rise of ISIS, further weakening the entire area. Morocco, however, is relatively strong. 

The take away point from this quick analysis is the fact the MENA region is too diverse and complex to be labeled as either strong or weak region. Each country has its own characteristics and unique structure. However, I believe that, and at the exception of few countries such as Saudi Arabia, the entire region could be characterized as fragile due to the various issues it is dealing with at the current moment.

Tunisia

Having talked about Tunisia, I think this might be of interest! http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/north-africa-beyond-jihadist-radicalization

This is from last year, but pretty funny and relevant to our current discussions.

The Onion: Everyone In Middle East Given Own Country In 317,000,000-State Solution

 ISSUE 50•28 • Jul 17, 2014

 

 

NEW YORK—Marking the latest and most ambitious attempt to bring stability to the region, the United Nations announced Wednesday that every single person in the Middle East will receive his or her own sovereign nation as part of a historic 317,000,000-state solution.
The broad and extensive compromise, which affects more than 3,000,000 square miles formerly occupied by the territories of Israel, the West Bank, Gaza, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Oman, Yemen, Egypt, and Jordan, will reportedly draw over 750,000,000 new borders in what experts claim will help drastically curb sectarian violence.

Rentier States

Several of your readings for this week deal with the issue of rentier states in the MENA region. Thus far, we have talked about the big interventionist state, which is simultaneously quite weak in legitimacy. Do you think a rentier state is more or less legitimate in the eyes of its citizens? In other words, does a rentier economy help or hurt the problem of a disconnect between state and citizens? Provide a clear rationale for your argument.

Response to Weak/Strong state question

So not clear if these need to be comments or a new post.

The readings have emphasized two basic themes. First, that the states in the MENA region fall on a spectrum from those that possess most or all of the characteristics of states, to those that aspire to statehood but lack even basic qualities of being a state. And second, that for almost all countries in the region the state itself plays a huge role in the domestic life, development and economy of the country. The vast majority of the states have employed some form of heavily state-led development project over the last fifty years and many of these have employed import substitution industrialization. These policies have saddled the typical MENA state with an enormous public sector that operates at a loss with equally enormous inefficiencies. The states find these situations both useful, for purposes of controlling development and providing jobs, but also challenging because they result in crippling economic problems that often must be overcome either with oil sales or foreign assistance.

In studying the MENA region, we tend to approach the ‘strong’ states differently than the ‘weak’ ones.

On the issue of automatic assumptions

The coverage of the recent murders of three Muslim students in North Carolina gives some food for thought - this article gives you an idea of the kind of 'automatic assumptions' I'm hoping you'll identify in your critical reassessment study.

Strong versus Weak States

The notion of ‘strong’ states versus ‘weak’ states requires some elucidation. What would you say is the correct characterization of the typical MENA state? In the study of MENA political dynamics (or political dynamics anywhere for that matter) what are the implications of differing conceptualizations of ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ states?

Arab Nationalism, Doomed or destined

     Since the advent of Islam and the spread of the Arabs outside the Arabia to what is known today as the Arab world, the Arab countries have never been united under the banner of Arabism. Different fashions of unions have always been cementing the region or parts of it but all with dynasties of a sort of Islamism. The notion of the Arabism has only started to appear less than a century ago on the hands of the Christian Syrian thinkers. That was due to three factors; the influence of the West, the appearance of the nation-state form of countries and the oppression of the Ottomans on minorities that particularly in the late nineteen century and the beginning of the twenty century.

The abolishing of the Islamic caliphate in Istanbul plus the striving of the Arab countries to gain their independence has helped gave the notion of Arab Nationalism a romantic and ideological impulse.

What makes the Arab nationalism?

Although the region has differences like ethnicities and minorities, I assume that the natural factors of the Arab Nationalism are valid and do exist. The overall fabric of the region is almost the same, the one language, the common heritage, the same cultural background, and the same history.

However, the first attempt to forge a sort of unity between the Arab countries was the establishment of the league of the Arab States in the eve of the end of the WWII. The founding of the Arab league was actually the minimum level of unification between the newly independent Arab countries. It is obvious from the name (the League of the Arab States) that the leaders then were not even thinking about giving up any inch of their newly gained sovereignty to a supra-national entity. There is no mention to the Arab unity whatsoever in the charter of the Arab league, but rather intra states cooperation. 

Nasser of Egypt not only reshaped the notion of the Arab-Nationalism but also gave it a new dimension. For the first time in the modern history the Arab nationalism has come to reality when the most important Arab country used its both soft and hard power to mobilize the Arab masses from the ocean to the gulf (the Atlantic ocean to the Persian Gulf) for one cause, which is the Arab Unity.

The Arab countries during this time were divided into two groups; the first group according to the Nasserites was the progressive regimes aka the newly established republics ruled by army officers. The second was the reactionary (Rajey) regimes ruled by sheikhs and monarchs specially those in the Gulf. As a matter of fact, this division has engulfed the region in more attritional struggles among the Arab countries and yielded into nothing but more failures on many fronts.

The attempts to impose the unity from the top like these of Egypt-Syria were short lived and a failure. Some argue that the unity of that tiny oil rich Emirates of the Gulf named United Arab Emirates were the only successful story of the Arab unity. However, there are some doubts about the significance of such a small tribal depopulated state as a scale of success of a real Arab unity. 

The Comparison between the Arab countries failure to achieve even economic integration and the success of the European countries to reach the level of the Union is very tempting.

 Some analysts argue that, despite the different languages and the history of wars in Europe, these countries were able to build their union step by step until the moment where we see now a twenty eight states united in almost all the economic and security fronts. On the other hand the Arab countries, enjoying the common heritage and same language have failed to achieve any substantial form of unity.

In my humble opinion there are three fundamental reasons (establishing Israel is none of them) why Arab countries failed to achieve even a sound economic block similar or close to the European Union.

First and foremost, the Lack or the absence of Democracy;

The democracies in Europe were able to manage their differences in a manner that were technically and politically efficient. However, in the Arab front, the Common Arab Market that was initiated even before the European Common Market has crippled by the undetermined well of the members. What is called now Great Arab Free Trade Area GAFTA is only a deformed entity that has no mechanism to commit its members.  Moreover the Absence of any people representation in the process of the unity projects, whether economic or political, makes it even difficult to have something sustainable.

Second, the Level of Development;

 Most of the European countries have high degree of human development. It is very crucial in the process of grouping to look at the levels of education, health, and public service. Looking at the Arab world the picture in many countries are bleak. The importance of this element can be illustrated in the technical and administrative expertise that was behind pushing the European Unity forward.

  

Thirdly, Economic Structural Discrepancies;

The imbalances in the economic structures amongst the Arab countries where some countries have per capita income 20 times more than other sister Arab country is a stumbling block. Additionally, the different political systems across the region makes it almost impossible to achieve any considerable sort of unity. How country as Qatar coordinates its monetary polices with Somalia or Mauritania?  

Moreover, the Arab states’ failure, which were not only in Arab unity but also in the battle of development, has put the whole region in peril. The Arab spring is the herald of new Era. 

Arab Nationalism & MENA Political Intergration

The Arab awakening first originated during the 19^th century as a revolutionary movement against the Ottoman Empire. During this period, Arab countries based their identity more on religion than on the common language. However, after WWI of Arab nationalism, became a significant ideology meant to guide Arab countries and reunite them due to their similarities: culture, language, and customs. Therefore, the Arab identity is meant to empower the newly independent countries from outside forces. Although this pertinent ideology was very popular between 1950-60, the popularity of Arab nationalism began to decline after the Six-Day War, leading this latter to slide towards political marginality.

There are, and unfortunately, many factors that work against the political integration of the MENA region. At that time there were various conflicting obstacles such as different loyalties and different interests. At present moment, there are even more obstacles and tensions between Arab countries that would prevent them from reaching political integration. For instance, a simple example, if Arab countries were to be integrated, Algeria and Morocco would need to agree on the issue of Western Sahara, which is impossible. This issue has been going on since 1963 and the diplomatic relations between the two countries are somehow shaken and witnessing many challenges. For example, the borders between the two countries are closed. If a simple bilateral relation is not possible, how can we be politically integrated?

Additionally, the idea of integrating Arab countries into one political union is not a new one. AMU, the Arab Maghreb Union, is a trade agreement between Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia aiming for economic and political union. However, AMU is stagnant due to the persisting Algerian-Moroccan issue. If the previous efforts to reunite just the Maghreb have failed so far, I do not envision reuniting both Maghreb and Mashreq under one Arab identity especially when we take more complex problems into consideration such as the Israeli-Palestinian issues.

Finally, regarding the EU model. I believe the aftermath of the Euro-crisis illustrated the complexity of this model. Having such a union made the euro zone countries very dependent of one another and prone to domino effect. The crisis showed that integrating weak southern economies to strong northern economies such as France and Germany made ECB in a conflicting position when it comes to setting an efficient interest rate and acceptable debt ratio. In other words, I do not envision a political/economic union because from what we learned from the euro crisis. Assuming we solved all the current persisting political issues, different countries are at different phases of the economic cycle some are ongoing a recession, others are booming. Thus, each country needs specific set of micro and macro economic policies that are specific to its own need. Having a central bank like ECB imposing the same policies on each country would just not be effective.

Arab Nationalism and a MENA Version of the EU

Arguments for and against Arab nationalism continue to be debated. Much have the date has shifted from does Arab nationalism exist to when did it end. As an idea, it certainly seemed to exist in the early 20th century and peaked around the policies of Nasser in the 1950s. The creation of a unified Egyptian and Syrian state appeared to signify the culmination of these previous ideals. A unified Arab region was growing. 

Due to factors such as a common language, some cultural similarities, and a common religion - Islam - some see Arab nationalism as still existent today. However, this fails to recognize many of the distinct differences across MENA. Islam is not merely one unified religion. The branches of Sunni and Shi'a alone signify a sharp divide within the religion, and this does not account for the numerous sects within those as well. There are also marked cultural differences across the Middle East. Using Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Egypt, and Morocco as only a few examples quickly destroys the idea that there is one unified Arab identity. 

Political integration has been difficult for this wide array of countries for a number of reasons. Some of the countries have dealt with so much internal strife, coups, revolutions, etc., they have not had time or space to consider regional alliances. In other cases, due to religious differences (for example the Sunni/Shi'a split), an alliance was out of the question from the beginning. Furthermore, colonial interests and the Cold War divide have forced some Arab states to keep closer ties to their western allies rather than focus on regional alliances. 

If there was to be a regional supra-national entity similar to the EU, there would need to be some significant changes in the current Middle Eastern state relations. First, there would need to be stability in multiple countries. As a result of the Arab Spring, many of the MENA states are still searching for internal stability, which a regional alliance needs. Second, regional alliances are built on shared values. To use polarized examples again, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, and Tunisia do not have a shared understanding of women's rights, worker's rights, or religious freedom rights. Most regional alliances, like the EU, form agreed upon doctrine to govern these rights across multiple states. Finally, there has to be trust in the other government's in the region. Due to instability and lack of shared values, not all states in MENA trust the others. Without at least a basic level of trust, it would be difficult to form an allegiance that would open trade and access borders in the same way the EU has. At this point in time, the most we could hope for in terms of a regional alliance within the next 50 years would be between a limited number of states that could agree on some of these things. For example, (understanding that there would still need to be advances in some of the above listed categories) there could be a MENA version of the EU between Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria (if it stabilized), and Palestine (if they become a state). But in the short term and with the current geo-political realities, it seems highly unlikely. 

Political Integration & the Failure to Sustain ‘Arab Nationalism’

Hussein Bazzi

There are multiple factors to consider whenever attempting to define a 'nation' and what unites it, such as historical roots, geopolitics and boundaries, or shared ethnic, linguistic, and/or religious identities. Although the MENA region is made up of many tribal, religious, and socio-economic groups, the defining characteristic of an ‘Arab Nationalism’ stretching across the Middle East and North Africa would have to be the shared ethnic and linguistic make-up during the transition to separate nation-states after the Arab world’s colonial period. However, many obstacles stood in the way of the realization of this vast political integration of the Arab world during the early development of these border-separated states and only multiplied as the decades passed.

The first major impediment to the existence of a single Arab Nationalism was inter-Arab power struggles and the balance between domestic state-building versus cooperation. In the fourth chapter of “State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East,” Roger Owen mentions the League of Arab States, which was created in 1945 as a union of Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Lebanon, as a manifestation of state-to-state cooperation that created much popular enthusiasm. However, this experiment failed because Egypt’s dominance during that time period pushed other states in the League into subservient roles. Owen mentions “the actual experience of Syrian union with Egypt” as an example of a country that was unhappy with Egypt’s imposing its will on the other states (p. 58). Later, after President Assad rose to power, he stated that he would never be “maneuvered into such a subservient position again” (p. 59).  In later decades, after the death of Nasser and Egypt’s economic and military decline, other states rose to prominence and different power balances emerged. Saudi Arabia became a financial power in the region while Syria had a growing political importance after the consolidation of the Assad regime. Other weaker countries experienced coups and instability, such as Lebanon that was unable to “contain the conflicting forces at loose on its own national terrain” (p. 63). With regards to the Lebanon example, their weakness as a state made them victims of their geopolitical situation, including their place in both intra-Arab and Arab-Israeli rivalries. Also, in terms of regional divides, there were geographical splits between the Arab world into the fragmented regions of North Africa, the heartland of the Arab world including Greater Syria and Iraq, and Eastern Arab states of the Gulf. A trend emerged where more powerful Arab states placed an emphasis on its own territorial nationalism to impose its legitimacy. These examples of the shape-shifting power struggles in inter-Arab relations are just a few of the many ways that visions of pan-Arabism took a backseat to geopolitics.

A second major reason that the Arabs could not unite under a pan-Arabism movement was the developments of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the ability of the Palestine issue to first unite Arab states and then later divide them. Early in the transition to independence, practically all Arab regimes were united for the Palestinian cause in the face of Jewish and British settlers. However, after Israel’s military dominance and their subsequent occupation of lands outside their state in 1967, the policies of Arab regimes towards Israel and Palestine began to diverge. Militarization of the Palestinians led to a mutually favorable relationship between Jordan and Israel as the Hashemite Kingdom wanted to rid its country of Palestinian guerrillas. On the other hand, the existence of the PLO in Lebanon pushed the unstable country into Civil War, ultimately the occupation of the small, vulnerable, and multi-sect country by Israel in 1982. Egypt signed a peace treaty with Israel in1979; in contrast, Syria built its military capacity to be able to confront Israel and exercise influence over Palestinian nationalist movements. So, even the Arab-Israeli conflict eventually became a dividing factor in the Arab world after once being one of the few stances in which virtually all the Arab regimes agreed.

I do not envision a situation where there could be a supra-national entity of a pan-Arabism in the Modern Middle East for three major reasons. First, the discussion of creating an Arab Nationalism over the entire Arab world is now much more complex than it ever was. The first League of Arab States contained 5 members that failed in state-to-state cooperation. Now, there are over 21 Arab states stretching from North Africa through the Arabian Peninsula. Since the early transition from colonialism, countless developments and contradicting stances on any range of issues have come about making inter-Arab relations a remarkably complex web. Secondly, the important role of non-Arab actors in the region – Turkey, Iran, and Israel – have legitimate and even dominant amounts of influence on the region and have changed the geopolitics of the Arab world without being Arab. For example, Syria is aligned directly with Iran and would not sabotage that alliance for any other Arab state. Thirdly, the role of international proxy war has significantly changed the way power is brokered in the Middle East on an international level, beginning during the Cold War between America and the Soviet Union. Aside from Israel, which is clearly the United States greatest ally in the region, many Arab countries such as Egypt, Jordan, and the oil-rich Gulf countries have alliances with the U.S. On the other hand, ‘anti-western’ states such as Syria, Iran, and Iraq, were backed by the Soviets. However, since the beginning U.S. world hegemony after the Soviet Union’s collapse, countries backed by the U.S. have received tremendous financial assistance from the world power, while the Russian backed non-allies of Iran and Syria have been weakened by American foreign policy, and even sanctioned. This phenomenon has evolved into a deeper, regional, and bipolar struggle between the large and oil rich countries of Iran and Saudi Arabia.

Political Integration

What is the argument for “Arab nationalism”? What factors have worked against political integration in the MENA region? Could you envision a scenario where a supra-national entity like the European Union develops in the MENA region? Why/why not?