Response to Weak/Strong state question

So not clear if these need to be comments or a new post.

The readings have emphasized two basic themes. First, that the states in the MENA region fall on a spectrum from those that possess most or all of the characteristics of states, to those that aspire to statehood but lack even basic qualities of being a state. And second, that for almost all countries in the region the state itself plays a huge role in the domestic life, development and economy of the country. The vast majority of the states have employed some form of heavily state-led development project over the last fifty years and many of these have employed import substitution industrialization. These policies have saddled the typical MENA state with an enormous public sector that operates at a loss with equally enormous inefficiencies. The states find these situations both useful, for purposes of controlling development and providing jobs, but also challenging because they result in crippling economic problems that often must be overcome either with oil sales or foreign assistance.

In studying the MENA region, we tend to approach the ‘strong’ states differently than the ‘weak’ ones.

A strong state, such as Egypt, or Turkey, is often approached through the lens of its professed ideology, party system, colonial legacy, superpower relations, and dominant national leader such as a charismatic president. This method of conceptualizing the state emphasizes the corporatist and patronage aspects of states in the Middle East.

In contrast, weak states, such as Somalia, Yemen, or Libya are approached more often through the perspective of identity politics, family, tribal and ethnic divisions. In the study of political dynamics, these different approaches tend to lead us to analyze weak states through relatively simplistic filters, such as Sunni/Shia conflict, ethnic conflict, ancient feuds, etc.

Perhaps counter-intuitively, these divergent views of the different state types lead to opposite prescriptions by foreign reformers. To the strong-state corporatist regimes, outside reformers typically recommend reducing the size of government, implementing federal systems, and privatizing the economy. In essence, weakening the government to reduce the ability of any one regime or faction to use it for personal enrichment and autocratic rule. Unsurprisingly, the regimes in question view these recommendations with suspicion. In contrast, the diagnosis for weak states is that they lack enough government. Yemen famously has never controlled all of its territory. Libya, though it once gave every appearance of being a strong state*, in fact turns out to be a fragile conglomeration of un-reconciled factions with wildly incompatible visions of government. In these cases, the international community seeks to build stronger governments that are capable of exercising a monopoly over legitimate violence. Whether any of these approaches that will lead to a positive outcome given the inherited weaknesses of both state types is a completely different matter

* The most important aspect of the ‘strong’ state description is that it can so often be wrong. States that appear strong are so often only faking it on the surface, when in fact they’re extremely vulnerable to small fluctuations in macro economic trends or global politics.