"She turned me into a newt!"

Two African Nationals Arrested for - get this - *Sorcery*

First, let me just explain the source: I have a burning curiosity about Oman and the "black box" status in most Middle East studies courses. So, an effort to remain abreast of internal Omani current events has really turned into a form of entertainment. The Times of Oman is either run by the Sultanate or heavily censored by it, because the headlines that come out of that paper would make any local paper question if that is really news.

Now, back to the sorcery.

Oman has been actively working on "Omanization" where legislation/royal decrees are issued to make hosting foreign national workers more difficult for businesses operating in Oman. Quotas for local employment percentage, higher fees for visas, and stricter requirements are among the few things I've seen implemented. Of the history I know through several RAND reports from the 1990s, this is consistent with the forward vision Sultan Qaboos has for modernizing Oman.

Beyond just being suspiciously bland headlines, the articles are not much more than long headlines. This one caught my eye because it made me wonder if it was evidence of a racial/cultural pecking order.

As is the nature of this area, there are only questions, so feel free to speculate with me:

Oman has been free from the criticism that has befallen Saudi Arabia and Qatar as far as the foreign workers, but is that a result of their near media blackout or because something is handled differently?

If they're the same, as I suspect they are, is this a kind of African-orientalist perspective? After reading the article, the two people were arrested under fraud charges - sorcery was not mentioned at all. So why write the article that way?

If this is a sense of superiority to Africans (whether due to race or culture), are guest workers from other Asian countries treated differently/better?

Algeria - rumbles in the dark

Algerian Power Struggles

In the article above, there is a discussion among several regional experts about the current status of powers in traditional power centers: Military, Intelligence, and the Executive.

To catch up all you Algerian enthusiasts out there - President Bouteflika relieved the long-time chief of the Department of Intelligence and Security (known by the French acronym DSR). Many did not know the man's face at the time, but then his picture was published in the paper when he was dismissed. He has since reshuffled the DSR to be the DSS (Department of Surveillance and Security) appointing his choice man to lead it and restructuring the institution to report directly to him.

Several ex-military officers were dismissed from the administration as an effort to prevent military intrusions into the political executive branch.

This is all happening along the back drop of crashing oil prices (Algeria's natural gas exports account for 98% of all exports). Subsidies and social programs have been cut back, all while increases in cost-of-living have gone unabated.

Oh, and did I mention the president only recently made an appearance in public after a 2+ year hiatus? There are increasing questions as to who is truly in charge of the administration.

In final observation, the Bouteflika clan is increasing posturing itself to prevent backlash should the president die/be deposed. Moves to secure familial ties signify breaks in the ruling elites and could be openings for future political movements.

Changes are coming in Algeria - and they will be monumental if not also potentially destabilizing.

The Arab Spring in terms of Greed vs. Grievance

Jared and I took a course last semester called “Conflict in Africa.” In our study of the root causes of civil war, our class read Understanding Civil War, a book edited by Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis [Click here to download a copy of the book from the World Bank website]. The book is based an econometric model, developed by Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, which introduces the scholarly debate on the root causes of civil war, commonly known as greed versus grievance. Greed—also known as opportunity—refers to an atypical circumstance that creates an opening to revolt. Greed reflects the desire of actors to better their situation as part of a cost-benefit analysis; actors judge if the opportunity cost of civil war, armed conflict, or protests outweigh the potential benefits. For example, individuals also may be more likely to revolt in countries with low GDP per capita and high unemployment because the opportunity cost of revolting is low for individuals that are underpaid or unemployed. These actors do not have to worry about losing their job if they do not currently have one. Furthermore, the cost of protesting might also be low is the government is weak militarily. If rebels believe that the government lacks the capacity to quash unrest, this reality may embolden actors to stand up against a corrupt regime. Grievance represents the reason that the people would revolt against the government or other parts of the population. The model identifies political repression, political exclusion, and economic inequality as variables that increase levels of grievance. 

Using this framework, the Arab Spring failed to take hold in some countries based on the degree of greed (opportunity). Rentier states had enough financial resources to make the costs of revolution too high for movements to succeed. Resource-rich countries increased their fiscal expenditures to provide more services to their citizens to quell unrest. In the Saudi Arabia, Richards and Waterbury noted in their conclusion that the Kingdom’s expenditures increased by more than a third following the Arab Spring. Additionally, Saikal argues that four factors helped the monarchy reduce the potential for unrest during the Arab revolutions. First, oil largess allowed the King to buy popular support and silence regime critics as needed. Second, the size of the Saudi royal family and the series of linkages to important tribes and business elites promotes stability. Third, the geographic distance between major urban centers allows the government to isolate one of them in the case of protests. Fourth, the strong US civilian and military presence provided a tacit vote of international support to the Kingdom. The combination of state strength enabled by oil wealth and fiscal expenditures muted the potential for uprisings in the Kingdom and limited the success of protests in Bahrain.

The costs of the revolution were much lower in Egypt and Tunisia than in the resource rich Gulf countries. In terms of Collier and Hoeffler, both countries were more low-hanging fruit for revolution because the opportunity cost of a revolution was low. Because of high levels of unemployment and underemployment, the benefits of protesting outweighed the opportunity cost. Additionally, Tunisia and Egypt both lacked the revenue from oil exports to increase their fiscal expenditures. Tunisia had a fiscal deficit of around six percent and Egypt’s deficit had ballooned to more than 12 percent, according to Richards and Waterbury. These government simply did not have the fiscal space to buy off opposition movements or make the costs of protests prohibitive.

Based on the model developed by Collier and Hoeffler, oil wealth is a key variable that limited the success of the Arab Spring in certain countries. Although each country in the region likely shared a similar level of grievances against the government, the opportunity cost for protests were much higher in the resource-rich countries.

Unpacking the Arab Revolts--Why some were more Successful than Others

We have been discussing social movement theory (SMT) for the past three of four classes, and I think using SMT to analyze the Arab Spring is certainly appropriate. As we have touched on in our lectures, in order for a social movement to be analyzed and critiqued effectively, it must be within these three levels of analysis: political opportunities and constraints; resource mobilization; and discursive opportunities and constraints. Looking at the success of the movements in Tunisia and Egypt allows us to unpack the failures of other movements.

Of note is the role of the state in these two countries. Tunisia and Egypt had a tightly controlled political process that made it difficult for outside voices to be heard. There was a great lack of freedom of expression, and the states attempted to restrain its citizens. However, both countries did not have the public funds to build very strong patronage networks, though they certainly tried. Because of this, and in particular in Tunisia, the regime allowed labor unions to function semi-autonomously from the government, providing a dimension of a civil society. The military was not as heavily involved in Tunisia as it was in Egypt, something that makes it unique to some other Middle Eastern countries. Because the military was so entrenched in the economy, they seem to be the real "rulers" of the country, with essentially the military "allowing" Mubarak to stay in power. However, once the ties turned, we all know that the military stepped aside, forcing Mubarak to step down.
Both countries still had clientelism and nepotism, as many Middle Eastern countries have in their own right.

So what allowed these social movements to be successful? In SMT, we see that both states were very willing to suppress any major movement, but it had allowed some informal networks, such as Enough and the hidden Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and the informal sector and labor unions in Tunisia. It needed to allow these movements in order to survive, since these countries do not have the large patronage and small population networks like some of the Gulf countries. It seems these movements had some sort of resource and discursive mobilization, because they were able to project a message of ousting the current regime. The activists in Tunisia, in particular, were able to mobilize around the self-immolation of Mohammed Bouazizi in order to catapult his act into the international arena. And most importantly, these activists were able to keep the movement nonviolent, which further legitimized their calls for freedom.

The reason other movements were not as successful plays in large part to the movements themselves. You often have violent activity perpetrated by activists, which ultimately de-legitimizes their activism, and basically allows security forces to fight back violently. Furthermore, some regimes were able to suppress any activism, either through patronage networks or through force. A good country to analyze is Saudi Arabia. While there is certainly a huge crackdown on freedom of expression and political participation, the al-Saud family only saw minor protests in the wake of much human rights violations. Why? Well the government has successful used its rentier wealth to provide many benefits to its citizens, including no taxation. The family has kept the "Islamists" in check by having the Wahabbi clerics as their closest ally. And the Saudi population is relatively small and its wealth vast compared to other Middle Eastern nations, it has been able to keep a close hold on its citizenry without much protest.

Another factor to look at is regime type. The Egyptian and Tunisian regimes were dictatorial and authoritarian in nature, which de-legitimized its rule first off. But the monarchies of Morocco and Jordan had smaller protests because people did not want to overthrow the monarchy; they just wanted more political freedom and human rights. I think looking at what the aims of each social movement is incredibly important. If it's not regime change (which was only the backdrop in some Middle Eastern countries), then it might make it easier for a state to allow those protests. Richards & Waterbury talk about this point throughout their text.

In general, however, for a social movement to be successful in MENA, it truly needs strong rhetoric, the ability to mobilize resources effectively, maintain a nonviolent stance, use informal and quietist networks to their benefit, and being able to compromise with different sectors of the population.

The Arab Revolts

Its hard to pinpoint exactly what makes a certain revolution more successful than others, as there can be many many different factors at different depths of society that can influence how a revolution unfolds. Looking at why other countries in the region did not experience as successful of a revolution as those in Tunisia and Egypt, we can identify some differences however. One thing that contributed to the success in Tunisia was that, unlike many of its neighbors, society was already fairly unified ethnically, religiously, and linguistically. Egypt, while more diverse than Tunisia, had a fairly robust history of groups that could bridge ideological differences to come to a common ground to form social movements, such as Shorbagy (2007) describes the Kefaya. This ability to compromise on some of the less pressing issues to focus on bettering the lives of the entire population is a key aspect of a successful social movement. Spreading your objectives too thin can lead to fragmentation of the movement. While sectarianism isn't completely to blame or even play necessarily the biggest role, I think it has contributed to the minimal successes enjoyed by the revolutions in Yemen, Bahrain, and Syria, and the regimes in power tried to play this to their advantage. Without a unified picture of how life will go on and cooperation will take place after the revolution, the revolution itself might fail in mobilizing people.

What did the Intifada Accomplish?

It's worth noting what Zunes says concerning non-violent resistance before delving into the Intifada. He describes it as "organized popular resistance to government authority" and that a vast majority stemmed from "democratic civil society organizations using nonviolent action and other forms of civil resistance". The essential 'non cooperation' with illegitimate authority is quite nuanced in the Palestinian case, because Israel itself is quite the legitimate power, and so the vacuum for an 'organized' non-violent movement to flourish becomes instantly convoluted in the larger power structures that are part of Palestine's national reality. Part of the Intifada's issues seems to be the lack of training on strategic nonviolent tactics. The lack of organization was manifested gravely in the violence of the Second Intifada. There needed to be a broader coalition based on compromise and consensus. But compromise was stifled by both sides in the conflict.

Dajani then speaks about how the PLO was tasked with providing and implementing the tactical steps of the Intifada. Dajani remarks how the process of testing boundaries left the Palestinians at once both empowered and frustrated. The First Intifada thus required Palestinians to reforumlate and reprioritize their agenda, goals, and even revisit the narrative. In this regard, the Intifada gave a global voice and perspective to the issue of Palestinian nationalism and liberation as a tangible feat, but one that would likely require a meeting of minds at a bargaining table, undoubtedly with a mediator (USA). Women also were able to vocalize their need for a distinct agenda beyond the goals of the national movement through the Intifada. Condition in Gaza were so harsh as to allow Hamas to flourish and provide food, support, medical care, The Intifada revealed the failed nature of the secular PLO.

The Intifada unfortunately created more hatred and distrust, and Dajani points out that "Palestinians themselves have contributed to widening the social distance by using more violent methods in their attacks against Israelis. Some Israeli groups did express sentiment towards the Palestinian cause, but almost never to the point of effectively changing their own governments stance, yet such sentiment has over the years been transported to liberal spaces in the West as a critique and social commentary on the complexity of the issue. The Intifada seemed to always lack a coherent strategy, and indiscriminate violence seemed to spin beyond the movement's control. Let's hope if there is a future iteration of such a movement, that it is more cohesive, less violent, and resolute. 

Understanding the Arab Revolts

Last week we explored the macro, meso and micro level factors that caused and/or facilitated the Arab Revolts in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. As you know, these three cases had some common variables, but also differed in key variables (particularly the Libyan case, where the outcome was a civil war with NATO involvement, rather than a non-violent social movement). Key macro level variables, such as high youth unemployment/underemployment, were certainly not limited to the three countries we discussed in class, so clearly something else had to be introduced for a popular uprising to succeed.

On the micro level, the existence of civil society networks and informal structures of mobilization may have been crucial in facilitating the rise of a sustainable social movement in Tunisia and Egypt (again, Libya was different), but where do you think we find the key to the success/failure of a movement? Which variables must combine in order for a successful revolutionary social movement to take place? Use examples from other MENA countries, where mobilizations were not as successful as in Tunisia and Egypt.