Regarding Egypt

This Brookings article seems to echo the feelings I expressed in class yesterday regarding the murder of the PhD student in Egypt.

Article on policy recommendations

This piece by Shadi Hamid might be of interest to you - he reflects both on the puzzle of the Obama administration's approach to Syria and the general problems of writing policy recommendations.

NYT Saudi Arabia Article

This is the piece I referenced in class about how the current economic conditions in Saudi Arabia (especially the low price of oil) have lead to unease and less opportunities for young people.

http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/17/world/middleeast/young-saudis-see-cushy-jobs-vanish-along-with-nations-oil-wealth.html?_r=0

On Orientalism

This is only tangentially related to class in that it is a modern example of orientalist tropes at work. This was an ad the LA Times posted for a Middle East correspondent. You can see the obvious backlash it received, which was then followed by the Times retracting and rewording it.

http://muftah.org/ancient-and-dazzling-cultures-why-western-journalism-is-still-failing-the-middle-east/#.VsT279Zh3q0

Om Kilthoum

A side from the academics, I was listening to this earlier, and thought I would share. I am sure one of the first readings mentioned Om Kilthoum, incredible song and performance!

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zZ2pvaKE2cU

This might not be the best translation, but it is something:
http://lyricstranslate.com/en/Aghda-al2ak-Aghda-al2ak.html

The State: Weak vs Strong

                The notion that countries can be grouped in 2 categories, either strong or weak can be very misleading. Although a strength in one area would cause a strength in another, not all strengths are positively correlated. For instance, a strong rule of law implies a stronger economy as businesses have unnecessary risk covered. However, rentier state may appear strong because of confounding variables such as resource abundance, which is purely based on luck rather than a specific cause.

                The readings for this week emphasize on the different strengths and weaknesses that can be analyzed on the state level. Author, Lisa Anderson addresses 3 points in her introduction that indicate statehood as follows: “continuous administrative staff, a military establishment which successfully monopolizes legitimate violence, and a financial and tax collection apparatus.” Even though the 2 first applies on rentier states, the third does not in many ways. Moreover, because rentier states have minimum taxation, and almost none on personal income, there is less of a need to fulfill the political and social demands of the population, as the government’s welfare system is seen as generosity from the monarchs, killing off opposition. Furthermore, strong states respond to popular demands, while weak ones do not. In that sense, the rentier monarchies should be considered weak states even compared to the other poorer states in the Middle East as their income levels has a weak relationship with the real value added economic output the labor force in these countries are producing. Richards and Waterbury.

                As to governance, effective forms of it seem to be lacking in the Middle East, even in the case of Lebanon, arguably the only historical democracy in the Middle East (excluding turkey), sectarianism have weakened the system to an extend where it became a source of instability rather than strength. Moreover, I believe that Richards and Waterbury’s classifications on RRLA, RPLA, RRLP are not the most accurate reflections of the state strengths. As resource richness can easily become a weakness such as in the case of most rentier states (excluding Qatar and the UAE), the same can be said on labor abundance. After all, a country with an uneducated labor abundance may cause that abundance to be an economic drain under the “welfare state.” An educated labor abundant country on the other hand would experience real benefits out of their labor abundance as skilled labor have greater value adding skills that makes their economy more competitive. It is also important to note the resource curse, there is a lack of incentive to develop skill in rentier states as governments secure employment with high wages to legitimize the monarchies.

                Nazih Ayubi mentions that one of the main points we should focus on while studying states is: “the type of class or group interests that the state action tends to favor…” I think this is key in defining strong vs weak states. If we would stick to this criteria, then we can define a strong state as a state that treats citizens equally and fairly. Pre-requisites for this includes a strong fair democracy, strong rule of law, and a strong secular foundation. Having all three is the recipe for a strong state, meaning all MENA countries are weak. 

Although many times it might seem sectarian, much of the conflict in the Middle East is rather class based as seen in Syria. Many of the merchant families that are close to AlAssad are Sunni or Christian rather than Alawites. Moreover, a regime that looks for alliances with groups within a state over another group will always face instability. However, it remains dominantly sectarian rooted in most forms. As Brian already mentioned in his post, the Bahraini state favors Sunnis over Shi’a citizens which is the main cause of the unrest. Even in Saudi Arabia, which seems to the foreign eye as a stable country, the repression of the Shi’a minority will backlash in the future. Take Daesh or ISIL as an example, after decades of minority, Sunni rule under Saddam Hussien, a similar extreme Shi’a regime emerged under Maliki, which was the most probable scenario after the fall of Saddam. Maliki was a Shi’a leader the same way Saddam was a Sunni leader, which created a power vacuum to the Sunnis as they became victims of the newly established regime, giving way for Daesh to fill that power Vacuum. If Iraq had an Iraqi secular leader, Daesh would not have emerged. It is interesting to point out that many Shi’a clerics were aware of that reality before the emergence of Daesh and were calling for a secular national government. Mixing religion and politics is always a recipe for disaster.

               

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KsTxaTKOF7Q

"Secularism Secularism, no Shi'asm or Sunnism" that is what they are chanting.  

For those of you who haven't read the article I found it very interesting and pertinent, given our class discussions and the movement developing within Europe in response to the immigration crisis. I was largely unaware of the historical precedent of acceptance for refugees in Sweden, especially those in from the Middle East as one quote illustrated "In the 1980s, Sweden accepted not just Iranians and Eritreans, but Somalis and Kurds." While balanced, the article certainly paints a grim narrative for the future asylum seekers. Given the success and diversity of previous generations of refugees, can the current backlash be attributed to merely the volume of Syrian refugees or something greater? Hope you enjoy. 

http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/02/10/the-death-of-the-most-generous-nation-on-earth-sweden-syria-refugee-europe/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=New%20Campaign&utm_term=%2AAfPak%20Daily%20Brief

The Weak State Narrative in the Middle East

The frameworks provided in our course readings this week suggest that many states in the Middle East and North Africa region are weak. State strength, as discussed by Anderson, reflects the state’s influence on social relations. States are strong if they have modern, participatory administrative structures, but weak states inconsistently provide services or collect taxes. Governance is the combination of political, social, economic, and institutional factors that affect the behavior of organizations and individuals. Therefore, state legitimacy is established by the continuity of an administrative staff, a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence, and the ability to collect taxes within a given territory.

Metrics in many countries in the Middle East, particularly countries that are endowed with natural resources and high populations, indicate that states are weak. The 2015 Fund for Peace Fragile States Index shows that almost all of the states in the Middle East and North Africa are fragile (http://library.fundforpeace.org/library/fragilestatesindex-2015.pdf). As cited in the Ayubi reading, Laroui believes that the “Arab state is obsessed with power and strength and may be strong in terms of its body. But the violence of this state is in reality an indication of its weakness and its fragility.” Weak Middle Eastern states have had to resort to defensive or violent behavior more frequently than strong states to maintain hegemony over a territory. Crackdowns on popular uprisings in Bahrain during the Arab Spring or the Syrian government’s atrocities against its people are indicative of a weak government. Virtually all of resource-rich, labor-abundant countries have been unable to bring economic success to the population and to mobilize the people around a common ideology (Richards and Waterbury 108). During the past 30 years, Algeria has struggled with economic crises and the government has not been responsive to the popular will. Many states in the Middle East and North Africa also struggle to maintain autonomy within their borders, as demonstrated by the rise of the Islamic State.

Blanket statements about state strength in the region can be misleading, as smaller countries endowed with natural resources grade above the Middle Income country average on rule of law, state capacity, and political freedom. However, the media’s portrays countries in the Middle East as weak. The headlines of The Economist’s Middle East and Africa section this morning suggest that the entire region is replete with weak states—“Gaza Strip: Rumblings underground;” “Jihadists in Libya;” “Jordan: At boiling point;” “Algeria: Who is in charge?” The prominence of the weak state narrative impacts how governments respond to crises in the region. Foreign governments take a more interventionist role to prop up or engage in “state building.” Since the state is considered weak, foreign intervention does not undermine the autonomy of that state—they already did not have control within its borders.

'Strong' vs 'Weak' States: What that Truly Means

By Hannah Feldman

The typical MENA state, in my view, appears to be strong militarily and coercively, but in actuality is rather weak. Throughout this week’s readings, it has been possible to pinpoint certain indicators for ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ states in the MENA region.

In Lisa Anderson’s article, she defines a ‘strong’ state as one that has modern administrative structures that are well established and stable. Furthermore, a ‘strong’ state can accommodate and respond to popular demand through political participation and civil society. On the other hand, in her view, a ‘weak’ state is one in which the administration is incapable of reaching a major part of the population (through extracting resources and providing services) or is characterized by patrimonial patterns of recruitment and operations. This could be seen through the use of patronage networks and the disproportionate reward to regime cronies or honored sects. Weak’ states tend to ignore or repress popular demand, which limits political participation.

Furthermore, throughout Chapter 3 in Richards and Waterbury, they discuss some key characteristics that make up a state. These include: administrative procedures such as legislation and regulation; rule of law; voice and participation; transparency; accountability; state capacity; and civil society. Most of the MENA states are also greatly dependent on foreign powers for aid and investment. In general, the RRLA countries such as Algeria, Syria, and Yemen rank relatively low compared to RRLP and RPLA countries. They only seem to come together regarding transparency, in which they are almost even with the RRLP countries, and the RPLA countries are ranked the least transparent of the three categories. Interestingly enough, rule of law indicators are higher in monarchies than authoritarian republics. If we are using Richards and Waterbury’s state indicators in a positive sense (such as good transparency, rule of law etc.) these would be considered strong states. Of course, this does not include economic strength, which they touch on regarding economic underperformance. In many of these regimes, economic underperformance leads to corruption in politics and everyday social transactions. This has suggested that privileged access to economic opportunities has disproportionately rewarded regime cronies, leading to corruption and the role of patronage. In the RRLA countries, mineral wealth provides incentives to rulers to gain power and hoard resources, angering deprived populations. For the RRLP countries such as Saudi Arabia, the oil rents provides the state revenues, so it does not have to tax the citizenry as much, making the state not as accountable to the citizenry. But patronage plays a large role in these countries.

In general, MENA states have not moved beyond the coercive and corporative stage to create a political system that enjoys the consensus of civil society and includes it as a basic component. This kind of political strength categorized as hegemony considering its attainment to be the defining attributes of a ‘strong’ state. According to Ayubi, MENA states rule on the basis of its monopoly of the coercive forces in society and violence that subjugate rather than complement society; thereby, it is better described as fierce than strong. Corporatism, or the domination of the institutions of the middle and working classes by the state in an attempt to create social and industrial harmony, has supplied the typical model of socio-political organization in the Arab world and applied to both monarchies and populist republics.

Labeling a state as ‘strong’ or ‘weak’ has some major implications. While I do believe I would label the average MENA state as ‘weak’ compared to, say, Europe or the U.S., I have to be mindful that is a very broad characteristics and not all MENA states are the same; this class has clearly demonstrated that. There are some definitely strong military states, but some also strong because they have a lot of control over their population and there isn’t too much internal revolt (i.e. Saudi Arabia). However, while empirically speaking, most MENA states could be noted as ‘weak’ in regards to their state capacity and political participation, it is not empirically sound to lump all MENA states into this box of ‘weakness’ when each has characteristics that make it ‘strong.’

Strong versus Weak States

The notion of ‘strong’ states versus ‘weak’ states requires some elucidation. What would you say is the correct characterization of the typical MENA state? In the study of MENA political dynamics (or political dynamics anywhere for that matter) what are the implications of differing conceptualizations of ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ states?

Pan Arabism and the future

Pan-Arabism rose as the region gained its independence. The notion that came with the movement is that with unity came power, while division weakened the region and the people that live within it and made them subjects of repression. Very similar to the Ottoman’s Tanzimat, Pan Arabism redefined what it means to be an Arab, taking steps to redefine the definition to include all Arabic speaking countries. The movement rose as a secular left leaning ideology that strongly opposed religious politics, but embraced Islamic civilization as one of the pillars of enlightened Arab history. Indeed, Micheal Aflaq, one of the most prominent Arab nationalist and the theorist behind the establishment of the Ba’athist party was a Christian, yet embraced the historical successes of Islam in influencing the region. Unfortunately the theory behind Ba’athism and Pan Arabism in general is modernizing the region with centralized populist agendas.

Jamal Abdel Nasser became a back spine for the Pan Arab movement and his ideas and successes swept the region east to west. Even the gulf monarchies were heavily affected by the rise of Nasserism in the region. It was at that peak that an Arab union was possible, starting with the United Arab Republic in 1958 which made Abdel Nasser dominate the politics and decisions of Syria, causing the 1961 Coup d'état that brought the UAR to its knees. Inspired by the Ba’athists in Iraq, the Syrian branch planned a successful coup d'état in March 8^th, 1963.

Pan-Arabism has declined since the fall of Jamal Abdel Nasser. Although the collective reality of the region became wide clear, the idea was destroyed from within. The Ba’athists in Iraq repressed the Shi’a majority, while the Ba’athists in Syria repressed a Sunni majority. The ideological roots of the Ba’athists party and Micheal Aflaq were underdeveloped and vague. Although the Pan Arabism secularism did not succeed in transforming the region to purely civil law countries, many secular norms developed because of the rise of Pan Arabism. Author Amira El-Azhary makes a strong case for the parity of education in Jordan and how women education in the region have come a long way. Educating women, and women equality are definitely a result of that era. Another trace of that can be seen within the Democratic Constitutional Rally in Tunis, and its first president Habib Bourguiba which banned polygamy in 1956. Although the party is not secular in terms of its democratic, free speech understanding, it did have some secular roots.

The main factors that destroyed a MENA integration is political differences between the countries especially in terms of economic and political development. Nasserism and Ba’athism along with leftist parties were not clear on their centrally planned economies despite Abdel Nasser’s successes in developing the Egyptian economy. The problem with Nasser is that he banned all opposing political parties despite Nasser’s vague political organization himself. The collapse of Nasser was the collapse of Nasserism, the only hope at the time to achieve practical unity.

I could never see a situation where the MENA region will be able to create a supra-national entity because of many reasons. First of all, the degree of development of the different economies limits the integration possibilities in the region. Moreover, the regimes are very different in nature, democratic regimes will not join hands with authoritarian republics or monarchies. Lastly, there has been many efforts in forming a more integrated Gulf Cooperation Council. The GCC have very similar regime structures and a homogenous population that is highly relatable. The GCC is currently a Custom’s Union, and has many shared economic and political activities. However, the council has discussed creating a monetary union for the past two decades and has failed to implement such a plan because of senseless reasons such as the name of the currency. Democratic regimes will give up some levels of sovereignty for the benefit of the population, however, authoritarian regimes would never give any part of sovereignty since the main goal is the regime’s survival rather than the country’s future. 

Contemporary Arab Nationalism

What is the argument for “Arab nationalism”? What factors have worked against political integration in the MENA region? Could you envision a scenario where a supra-national entity like the European Union develops in the MENA region? Why/why not?

Richards and Waterbury note that Arab Nationalism was not an antidote to Middle Class Woes and Political Instability in the Arab World. But clearly, it was meant to be. The problem with Arab Nationalism is that it was largely superficial. Government officials conveniently co-opted the larger Arab ethnic identity as a way to organize political alliances and structures in the region, LARGELY influenced off the models of their colonial predecessors.

With the failures of the economies of Egypt and Algeria, Islamic groups started regaining popularity in North Africa. In the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War, Arab Nationalism could not stand the test of the political changes undergoing in the Middle East. The rising geopolitical role of Turkey and Iran also highlighted the various non-Arab ethnic groups that could "compete with the big boys". The Israel-Palestine debacle has yet to be solved. After September 11th, political focus shifted to Iraq and Afghanistan, two geographically important, but not usually politically significant countries for stability in the general Asia military zone. Thus, with a consequent rise in Muslim Panic in the Western psyche, Pan-Islamism has once again gained the status as the MAIN identifier of the peoples of the Middle East. Linguistically, groups in Morocco and Turkey are not connected, and they have different political systems (monarchy vs democracy), in fact, Turkey is still eyeing European ambitions for greater stability and economic opportunities. BUT, Islam has resurged in University groups, public forums, internet discussions, and both groups can identify as Muslim without concern about how that aspect of their identity would be judged. Pan-Islamism is almost a more genuine of self-identification, and easier/more inclusive to different ethnic and linguistic groups (but harmful to minority religious groups). 

In the Middle East, various ethnic and religious groups exist, gender and class and education levels are anything but equal, but the general identity of Muslim for the VAST majority of Middle Easterners has contributed to facilitating and dispersing Islamic ideologies. As varied as these ideologies are, they have certainly overpowered Pan-Arabism as a viable option for political elites to modernize the structures of their governments. 

Thoughts on Contemporary Arab Nationalism

No one argument for Arab nationalism exists. In the nexus of the Arab world, policies aimed at uniting Arab lands have changed at the same moments that history has shifted dramatically: The fall of the Ottoman Empire and dispersement of unified Arab lands into more divided colonial states; the further shirking of colonial oppression into a cohesive Arab identity, only to be foiled by the realization that Arab culture is not monolithic; bandwagoning against western and Jewish power in the region complicated by tense alliances and a spectrum of government structures ranging from tacit approval of western ideals to the embracing the notion of the "great Satan." The only real salient argument that remains - and remains poignant - is the removal of western influence into the economic and political variables that make up any nation state, MENA or otherwise. Multiple reasons exist for the decline in Arab nationalism and why the many Arab nations have failed to collectively create an Arab supranational identity. 

The Egyptian led Arab coalition's failure against Israel after the Six Day War was a huge blow to Egypt's Nasser, seen at the time as the driving figure for Arab nationalism. Compounded by a weakened economic and military structure in Egypt, Nasser's nationalistic agendas became less important and set the stage for incoming Egyptian heads of state to reduce the view of the country as a leader of the Arab fatherland. The ideological fall of Egypt in this sense illustrates the fragility of the political structure that existed to hold up hopes for Arab nationalist reform. 

The rise and fall of secularism, coinciding with an increased fervor for Islamic reform in many Arab nations has also caused a decline in nationalistic sentiment. Basic arguments aside from which sects carry which differences, the basis for what makes any Islamic Arab nation "Islamic" varies wildly. Some MENA countries have established Islamic government structures as a means of coalescing disparate tribes (see Saudi Arabia) while others may have embrace more Islamic structures at the same time it was convenient to be fearful of western influence in politics (see Iran). At the same time non governmental, yet political Islamic groups nonetheless, have stepped into the fold to fill the void left by the national government, such as the Islamic Brotherhood in Egypt and Hizbollah in Lebanon. 

The failure of Arab nations to reconcile their political similarities and a disconnect of Islamic unity, furthered by regional hegemons constantly backing ideological allies, will continue to make the likelihood of an Arab multinational body in MENA unlikely. I see only under specific circumstances this trend reversing. Namely the rise of a more secular youth population that sees the previous regimes and political structures as lacking, and pushes for the needed reforms to dismantle these structures. However, being able to measure this impact will be a long way off as many of these movements are nascent and have encountered their own struggles as evidenced by the volatility of secular and Islamic power in just the last five years since many Arab spring struggles have ended hostilities. 

Jared