The
notion that countries can be grouped in 2 categories, either strong or weak can
be very misleading. Although a strength in one area would cause a strength in
another, not all strengths are positively correlated. For instance, a strong
rule of law implies a stronger economy as businesses have unnecessary risk
covered. However, rentier state may appear strong because of confounding
variables such as resource abundance, which is purely based on luck rather than
a specific cause.
The
readings for this week emphasize on the different strengths and weaknesses that
can be analyzed on the state level. Author, Lisa Anderson addresses 3 points in
her introduction that indicate statehood as follows: “continuous administrative
staff, a military establishment which successfully monopolizes legitimate
violence, and a financial and tax collection apparatus.” Even though the 2
first applies on rentier states, the third does not in many ways. Moreover,
because rentier states have minimum taxation, and almost none on personal
income, there is less of a need to fulfill the political and social demands of
the population, as the government’s welfare system is seen as generosity from
the monarchs, killing off opposition. Furthermore, strong states respond to
popular demands, while weak ones do not. In that sense, the rentier monarchies
should be considered weak states even compared to the other poorer states in
the Middle East as their income levels has a weak relationship with the real
value added economic output the labor force in these countries are producing. Richards
and Waterbury.
As to
governance, effective forms of it seem to be lacking in the Middle East, even
in the case of Lebanon, arguably the only historical democracy in the Middle
East (excluding turkey), sectarianism have weakened the system to an extend
where it became a source of instability rather than strength. Moreover, I
believe that Richards and Waterbury’s classifications on RRLA, RPLA, RRLP are
not the most accurate reflections of the state strengths. As resource richness
can easily become a weakness such as in the case of most rentier states
(excluding Qatar and the UAE), the same can be said on labor abundance. After
all, a country with an uneducated labor abundance may cause that abundance to
be an economic drain under the “welfare state.” An educated labor abundant
country on the other hand would experience real benefits out of their labor
abundance as skilled labor have greater value adding skills that makes their
economy more competitive. It is also important to note the resource curse, there is a lack of incentive to develop skill in rentier states as governments secure employment with high wages to legitimize the monarchies.
Nazih
Ayubi mentions that one of the main points we should focus on while studying
states is: “the type of class or group interests that the state action tends to
favor…” I think this is key in defining strong vs weak states. If we would stick
to this criteria, then we can define a strong state as a state that treats
citizens equally and fairly. Pre-requisites for this includes a strong fair
democracy, strong rule of law, and a strong secular foundation. Having all three is the recipe for a strong state, meaning all MENA countries are weak.
Although many times it might seem
sectarian, much of the conflict in the Middle East is rather class based as
seen in Syria. Many of the merchant families that are close to AlAssad are
Sunni or Christian rather than Alawites. Moreover, a regime that looks for
alliances with groups within a state over another group will always face
instability. However, it remains dominantly sectarian rooted in most forms. As Brian already mentioned in his post, the Bahraini state favors
Sunnis over Shi’a citizens which is the main cause of the unrest. Even in Saudi
Arabia, which seems to the foreign eye as a stable country, the repression of
the Shi’a minority will backlash in the future. Take Daesh or ISIL as an
example, after decades of minority, Sunni rule under Saddam Hussien, a similar
extreme Shi’a regime emerged under Maliki, which was the most probable scenario
after the fall of Saddam. Maliki was a Shi’a leader the same way Saddam was a
Sunni leader, which created a power vacuum to the Sunnis as they became victims
of the newly established regime, giving way for Daesh to fill that power
Vacuum. If Iraq had an Iraqi secular leader, Daesh would
not have emerged. It is interesting to point out that many Shi’a clerics were
aware of that reality before the emergence of Daesh and were calling for a
secular national government. Mixing religion and politics is always a recipe
for disaster.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KsTxaTKOF7Q
"Secularism Secularism, no Shi'asm or Sunnism" that is what they are chanting.
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