Legitimacy of Rentier States

In class, we discussed the legitimacy of rentier and interventionist states. Because rentier states focus the bulk of their economy on only a few specific sources of income, it is important to see who is receiving the benefits of that income. In the Middle East, there isn't a large middle class. Most of the population is usually at one end of the spectrum or the other, rather than in between. The benefit of the rentier economy favors those at the high end of the spectrum, causing the gap between the two groups to grow wider.

Because there is such a dichotomy, I would say that this gap hurts the legitimacy of the state. One of the major examples would be the uprisings in 2011. Many youth were driven to protests because of the lack of basic rights, such as food or employment. In Bahrain, for example, Shiites quickly overtook the protests and added the sectarian angle, stating that Shiites were not as economically grounded as Sunnis and that they often lacked sufficient education and employment. In this case, the rentier economy benefits the government and its partners, rather than the population as a whole. Bahraini Shiites complained that they were being pushed out of employment in favor of foreign laborers, as it seemed that they had a larger share of the economy than actual Bahraini citizens.

This type of disconnect and disproportionate representation and access severely hurts a state's legitimacy. If the economy is seen as favoring one group or population over another, the state loses its legitimacy in the eyes of the people because it looks as if the rents are not being employed to serve the state as a whole. Because of this imbalance and the fact that the economy and the state are so closely tied together, it would seem as if rentier economies are less likely to experience legitimacy in the eyes of their population.

Rentier states: legitimacy and disconnect between state and citizens

I can not speak for the citizens of “rentier states” but I have given some thought to this subject. I also can't generalize due to the fact that there is quite a bit of variation between different regimes and their policies. In my opinion, the theory underestimates how certain levels of political stability, corruption, and foreign intervention would affect the perceived legitimacy of a given state. In the cases of Libya and Iraq – both of which continue to be failed states – it would be hard to believe that anyone has considered any of their regimes legitimate for many years, pre- or post-US involvement. However, within the GCC, oil rents have been used partly to actually strengthen certain aspects of their economies, not to mention large investments in infrastructure and education. Based on what I've read, many youth in the GCC and even in Iran are not necessarily looking to cause revolutionary change in their governments, but rather seeking gradual reforms. (Of course, many young Iranians are thoroughly disillusioned with their government, but perhaps grudgingly accept some level of legitimacy because they see no other realistic possibility of change.)

No matter how much a “rentier state” distributes its wealth to average citizens, one can easily find evidence of demands for more rights. Especially with increasingly educated populations who are tuned into the discrepancy between their rights and the rights given to citizens of other nations, the level/perception of legitimacy somehow might have begun to be less relevant than the ability to have one's government recognize certain rights and freedoms. And even “rentier states” that might not seem obligated to or concerned with answering the demands of their people have given in to some pressure for certain legal and other reforms, thereby increasing their legitimacy and narrowing the disconnect between state and citizens.

Rentier states and popular legitimacy

Rentier states are likely viewed as generally illegitimate by their citizens. If one is to take an economic approach to the concept, a rentier state implies a relationship of mutual benefit - citizens are provided for financially and the government expects them not to become a source of political challenge/contestation. The provision of rents is thus a fairly transparent substitute for the democratic concept of a social contract. When evaluating whether a rentier economy helps or hurts the problem of a disconnect between states it's important to identify the perspective from which we are conducting our evaluation. From a state's perspective, the connection with its citizens is strengthened because they are receiving government benefits which will likely be unavailable without the government as the distributor. The disconnect can also be exacerbated if states provide rents in a way that sectors of the population find to be unacceptable, such as in the case of Saudi Arabia. Even with this possibility in mind, a rentier economy benefits the state by, at the very least, buying it time to develop a resonant movement frame that will help it retain power if and when the rent-derived resource is not available. From the perspective of citizens, a rentier state may be legitimate only in that they respect the state out of fear for the consequences of not doing so. The price to pay for receiving rent benefits - political silence - will likely become more difficult to pay as social media has already created spaces for dissent that rentier and non-rentier states alike view as a threat.

On the issue of automatic assumptions

In response to Prof. Hardig's post "On the issue of automatic assumptions," the shooting over the weekend at a Texas Muhammad drawing contest is another example of the ways in which American media often portrays Muslims. Out of all of the coverage I've seen of the issue, none of it mentions the number of Muslims who peacefully protested and chose not to commit an act of violence (which I would venture to say is beyond the number of attackers who threatened the event). Second, news outlets are currently reporting that ISIS has claimed responsibility for the shooting, playing into the idea that the two men were somehow linked to the organization without any evidence thus far that they were other than the claim. While this possibility cannot yet be ruled out, it is also possible that ISIS has falsely taken responsibility for the attack in an effort to breed additional fear among Americans of attacks being carried out on U.S. soil, thereby enhancing its legitimacy as an organization that can execute a strike thousands of miles from its base. Reporting that ISIS has claimed responsibility without providing evidence of such, especially when mentioning the lack of evidence well after the headline, is an example of how American news media sometimes favor reporting expediency to the potential detriment of an accurate portrayal of events. I also found this phenomenon to be evident within the coverage of the Chapel Hill shooting; the notion that the man who killed the three students had committed a hate crime was pervasive and very little mainstream media coverage mentioned the fact that he had reportedly had problems with other non-Muslim neighbors in the past. It appears that in providing accurate and representative coverage of Muslims (as well as other minorities), American news media has its work cut out for itself.

Old Post: Strong vs. Weak States in MENA

The notion of ‘strong’ states versus ‘weak’ states requires some elucidation. What would you say is the correct characterization of the typical MENA state? In the study of MENA political dynamics (or political dynamics anywhere for that matter) what are the implications of differing conceptualizations of ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ states?


Though one of the key takeaways from the semester has been that painting all the states of MENA with such broad brush is highly problematic, if I were to generalize about state strength in MENA, I would characterize the region's states as "concentrated" but weak.

One must first acknowledge that the states of MENA exist on a wide spectrum.  While some states such as Libya and Syria have descended in chaos, others maintain relatively strong state institutions such as Saudi Arabia.

MENA states are 'strong' in the sense that many regimes use broad-reaching and often heavy-handed state institutions--especially the military--to control the population and maintain power. A typical example of this would be Syria, or arguably Egypt prior to the Arab revolts of 2011. With the military and the regime so closely intertwined the state apparatus is formidable and capable of exerting a great deal of influence in areas the government has a presence. However, some MENA states also seem to have trouble exerting this influence over their entire territory.  Though the large and sparsely populated area of some MENA states can partially account for this, semi-autonomous regions such a Kurdistan in Iraq, or the relatively independent Sinai, show some weakness for state apparati that could be considered overbearing to those living under their direct control.  In this way MENA states show characteristics of strength in areas that they definitively control, but are weak in the sense that many are unable to fully control all of the territory within their borders.

Gender in the MENA Region

Women tend to get the short end of the stick internationally. While there may be specific matriarchal cultures, overall nation-states are male-dominated and this tends to transcend into most cultural norms. However, it is very interesting the Western perspective we have of gender equality in the Middle East while there is still quite a bit of disparity present here stateside. 

The readings from this week cover the issues of gender equality in the MENA region. I believe both Western women and MENA region women face large challenges in gender equality but they are different styles of challenges. Tradition still plays a credible role in many rural areas in both the U.S. and MENA region. In these areas, women are often subjugated to stricter cultural norms that may constrain their ability to socially progress. In many rural MENA regions, women are expected to remain at home and fulfill their duty as a caregiver for both their families but in rural America, women are often also expected to behave a certain way. While there is more workforce mobilization available to women in the West, culturally women are also subjugated to unfair norms and institutions. Issues like abortion, marriage, birth-control etc are all highly contentious in the U.S. and conservative interpretations of these issues can severely constrict a woman's life, regardless of geographical location. 

The differences in challenges lay in the cultural and historical evolution of both areas. Even women in the United States and women in Western Europe differ in the amount of gender equality provided for them. Gender equality has progressed far more in certain aspects in Western Europe than it has in the U.S. due to the historical and cultural differences between the two. Without any deep research, one can see an obvious correlation between religiosity and gender equality- the U.S. and MENA region have deeply religious areas where women are treated differently and often restricted in their life choices in some way while Europe, a region with far less religiosity, offers more gender equality.