It's worth noting what Zunes says concerning non-violent resistance before delving into the Intifada. He describes it as "organized popular resistance to government authority" and that a vast majority stemmed from "democratic civil society organizations using nonviolent action and other forms of civil resistance". The essential 'non cooperation' with illegitimate authority is quite nuanced in the Palestinian case, because Israel itself is quite the legitimate power, and so the vacuum for an 'organized' non-violent movement to flourish becomes instantly convoluted in the larger power structures that are part of Palestine's national reality. Part of the Intifada's issues seems to be the lack of training on strategic nonviolent tactics. The lack of organization was manifested gravely in the violence of the Second Intifada. There needed to be a broader coalition based on compromise and consensus. But compromise was stifled by both sides in the conflict.
Dajani then speaks about how the PLO was tasked with providing and implementing the tactical steps of the Intifada. Dajani remarks how the process of testing boundaries left the Palestinians at once both empowered and frustrated. The First Intifada thus required Palestinians to reforumlate and reprioritize their agenda, goals, and even revisit the narrative. In this regard, the Intifada gave a global voice and perspective to the issue of Palestinian nationalism and liberation as a tangible feat, but one that would likely require a meeting of minds at a bargaining table, undoubtedly with a mediator (USA). Women also were able to vocalize their need for a distinct agenda beyond the goals of the national movement through the Intifada. Condition in Gaza were so harsh as to allow Hamas to flourish and provide food, support, medical care, The Intifada revealed the failed nature of the secular PLO.
The Intifada unfortunately created more hatred and distrust, and Dajani points out that "Palestinians themselves have contributed to widening the social distance by using more violent methods in their attacks against Israelis. Some Israeli groups did express sentiment towards the Palestinian cause, but almost never to the point of effectively changing their own governments stance, yet such sentiment has over the years been transported to liberal spaces in the West as a critique and social commentary on the complexity of the issue. The Intifada seemed to always lack a coherent strategy, and indiscriminate violence seemed to spin beyond the movement's control. Let's hope if there is a future iteration of such a movement, that it is more cohesive, less violent, and resolute.
Dajani then speaks about how the PLO was tasked with providing and implementing the tactical steps of the Intifada. Dajani remarks how the process of testing boundaries left the Palestinians at once both empowered and frustrated. The First Intifada thus required Palestinians to reforumlate and reprioritize their agenda, goals, and even revisit the narrative. In this regard, the Intifada gave a global voice and perspective to the issue of Palestinian nationalism and liberation as a tangible feat, but one that would likely require a meeting of minds at a bargaining table, undoubtedly with a mediator (USA). Women also were able to vocalize their need for a distinct agenda beyond the goals of the national movement through the Intifada. Condition in Gaza were so harsh as to allow Hamas to flourish and provide food, support, medical care, The Intifada revealed the failed nature of the secular PLO.
The Intifada unfortunately created more hatred and distrust, and Dajani points out that "Palestinians themselves have contributed to widening the social distance by using more violent methods in their attacks against Israelis. Some Israeli groups did express sentiment towards the Palestinian cause, but almost never to the point of effectively changing their own governments stance, yet such sentiment has over the years been transported to liberal spaces in the West as a critique and social commentary on the complexity of the issue. The Intifada seemed to always lack a coherent strategy, and indiscriminate violence seemed to spin beyond the movement's control. Let's hope if there is a future iteration of such a movement, that it is more cohesive, less violent, and resolute.
Great post Julio. Based on your last sentence, I am left wondering how future movements should go about building a "more cohesive, less violent, and resolute" structure. Although social media is often overblown in this regard (i.e. The Facebook Revolution), I think that social media would be one tool to help build this cohesive and resolute movement committed to non-violence. It builds communication between different segments of society to develop unifying messages and ease planning.
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