Unpacking the Arab Revolts--Why some were more Successful than Others

We have been discussing social movement theory (SMT) for the past three of four classes, and I think using SMT to analyze the Arab Spring is certainly appropriate. As we have touched on in our lectures, in order for a social movement to be analyzed and critiqued effectively, it must be within these three levels of analysis: political opportunities and constraints; resource mobilization; and discursive opportunities and constraints. Looking at the success of the movements in Tunisia and Egypt allows us to unpack the failures of other movements.

Of note is the role of the state in these two countries. Tunisia and Egypt had a tightly controlled political process that made it difficult for outside voices to be heard. There was a great lack of freedom of expression, and the states attempted to restrain its citizens. However, both countries did not have the public funds to build very strong patronage networks, though they certainly tried. Because of this, and in particular in Tunisia, the regime allowed labor unions to function semi-autonomously from the government, providing a dimension of a civil society. The military was not as heavily involved in Tunisia as it was in Egypt, something that makes it unique to some other Middle Eastern countries. Because the military was so entrenched in the economy, they seem to be the real "rulers" of the country, with essentially the military "allowing" Mubarak to stay in power. However, once the ties turned, we all know that the military stepped aside, forcing Mubarak to step down.
Both countries still had clientelism and nepotism, as many Middle Eastern countries have in their own right.

So what allowed these social movements to be successful? In SMT, we see that both states were very willing to suppress any major movement, but it had allowed some informal networks, such as Enough and the hidden Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and the informal sector and labor unions in Tunisia. It needed to allow these movements in order to survive, since these countries do not have the large patronage and small population networks like some of the Gulf countries. It seems these movements had some sort of resource and discursive mobilization, because they were able to project a message of ousting the current regime. The activists in Tunisia, in particular, were able to mobilize around the self-immolation of Mohammed Bouazizi in order to catapult his act into the international arena. And most importantly, these activists were able to keep the movement nonviolent, which further legitimized their calls for freedom.

The reason other movements were not as successful plays in large part to the movements themselves. You often have violent activity perpetrated by activists, which ultimately de-legitimizes their activism, and basically allows security forces to fight back violently. Furthermore, some regimes were able to suppress any activism, either through patronage networks or through force. A good country to analyze is Saudi Arabia. While there is certainly a huge crackdown on freedom of expression and political participation, the al-Saud family only saw minor protests in the wake of much human rights violations. Why? Well the government has successful used its rentier wealth to provide many benefits to its citizens, including no taxation. The family has kept the "Islamists" in check by having the Wahabbi clerics as their closest ally. And the Saudi population is relatively small and its wealth vast compared to other Middle Eastern nations, it has been able to keep a close hold on its citizenry without much protest.

Another factor to look at is regime type. The Egyptian and Tunisian regimes were dictatorial and authoritarian in nature, which de-legitimized its rule first off. But the monarchies of Morocco and Jordan had smaller protests because people did not want to overthrow the monarchy; they just wanted more political freedom and human rights. I think looking at what the aims of each social movement is incredibly important. If it's not regime change (which was only the backdrop in some Middle Eastern countries), then it might make it easier for a state to allow those protests. Richards & Waterbury talk about this point throughout their text.

In general, however, for a social movement to be successful in MENA, it truly needs strong rhetoric, the ability to mobilize resources effectively, maintain a nonviolent stance, use informal and quietist networks to their benefit, and being able to compromise with different sectors of the population.