The Arab Spring in terms of Greed vs. Grievance

Jared and I took a course last semester called “Conflict in Africa.” In our study of the root causes of civil war, our class read Understanding Civil War, a book edited by Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis [Click here to download a copy of the book from the World Bank website]. The book is based an econometric model, developed by Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, which introduces the scholarly debate on the root causes of civil war, commonly known as greed versus grievance. Greed—also known as opportunity—refers to an atypical circumstance that creates an opening to revolt. Greed reflects the desire of actors to better their situation as part of a cost-benefit analysis; actors judge if the opportunity cost of civil war, armed conflict, or protests outweigh the potential benefits. For example, individuals also may be more likely to revolt in countries with low GDP per capita and high unemployment because the opportunity cost of revolting is low for individuals that are underpaid or unemployed. These actors do not have to worry about losing their job if they do not currently have one. Furthermore, the cost of protesting might also be low is the government is weak militarily. If rebels believe that the government lacks the capacity to quash unrest, this reality may embolden actors to stand up against a corrupt regime. Grievance represents the reason that the people would revolt against the government or other parts of the population. The model identifies political repression, political exclusion, and economic inequality as variables that increase levels of grievance. 

Using this framework, the Arab Spring failed to take hold in some countries based on the degree of greed (opportunity). Rentier states had enough financial resources to make the costs of revolution too high for movements to succeed. Resource-rich countries increased their fiscal expenditures to provide more services to their citizens to quell unrest. In the Saudi Arabia, Richards and Waterbury noted in their conclusion that the Kingdom’s expenditures increased by more than a third following the Arab Spring. Additionally, Saikal argues that four factors helped the monarchy reduce the potential for unrest during the Arab revolutions. First, oil largess allowed the King to buy popular support and silence regime critics as needed. Second, the size of the Saudi royal family and the series of linkages to important tribes and business elites promotes stability. Third, the geographic distance between major urban centers allows the government to isolate one of them in the case of protests. Fourth, the strong US civilian and military presence provided a tacit vote of international support to the Kingdom. The combination of state strength enabled by oil wealth and fiscal expenditures muted the potential for uprisings in the Kingdom and limited the success of protests in Bahrain.

The costs of the revolution were much lower in Egypt and Tunisia than in the resource rich Gulf countries. In terms of Collier and Hoeffler, both countries were more low-hanging fruit for revolution because the opportunity cost of a revolution was low. Because of high levels of unemployment and underemployment, the benefits of protesting outweighed the opportunity cost. Additionally, Tunisia and Egypt both lacked the revenue from oil exports to increase their fiscal expenditures. Tunisia had a fiscal deficit of around six percent and Egypt’s deficit had ballooned to more than 12 percent, according to Richards and Waterbury. These government simply did not have the fiscal space to buy off opposition movements or make the costs of protests prohibitive.

Based on the model developed by Collier and Hoeffler, oil wealth is a key variable that limited the success of the Arab Spring in certain countries. Although each country in the region likely shared a similar level of grievances against the government, the opportunity cost for protests were much higher in the resource-rich countries.