Tuesday, April 12, 2016

The Arab Spring and Orientalism

            Many of our discussions in class this semester have centered on the prevailing Orientalist discourse in Western media. Orientalism, as examined by Edward Said, explains that the West views the Middle East as passive, backward, chaotic, violent, and exotic, which has led to overly broad generalizations about the region. Orientalist discourse builds these biases in Western media and academia, which ultimately distorts, exaggerates, and falsely represents the differences between cultures in the Middle East and the West. As I read the articles for class this week, I questioned whether the term, ‘Arab Spring,’ has Orientalist overtones and what impact those connotations has on my understanding of the region.
In one sense, the term ‘Arab Spring’ wrongfully pushes the West to analyze the revolutions in Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia collectively, rather than evaluating the protests in each country individually. As argued by Rami Khouri in several editorials in 2011, the phrase “lumps Arabs into a single mass of people who all think and behave the same way.” The label suggests that the revolutions occurred in similar countries and were inspired by the same underlying motivations, but the actors involved and the operating environment were unique. Although there are similarities in the uprisings, Lisa Anderson’s article in Foreign Affairs rightfully discusses the motivations of different actors. The patterns and demographics of the protests varied widely. In Tunisia, the protests began in the neglected rural areas and spread to the repressed labor movement. In Libya, the rebels in the eastern provinces ignited the protests and reinvigorated the tension amongst regional cleavages. Egypt’s revolution started with the urban youth in major cities and spread throughout the country. The term Arab Spring is an oversimplification of the underlying drivers of the revolutions.

Additionally, the Goldstone article provides an example of how the Orientalist framework is present in the study of the Arab Spring. Goldstone argues that citizens in the 2011 revolutions fought against “sultanistic” dictatorships. He defines this form of government in terms of the effort of a national leader to consolidate power, wealth, and personal authority. I do not understand why the term “sultanistic” is needed to describe this type of governance. He could have easily used terms, such as charismatic or bureaucratic authoritarian, used often in studies of Latin America.  Also, the use of the phrase ‘Arab Spring’ downplays other citizen movements that pushed for regime change in the Middle East and North Africa. As noted in a 2012 article by Shihade and Shihade in the International Journal of Peace Studies, citizens in the Middle East have long struggled against western colonialism and corrupt local government to fight for a better life. The ‘Arab Spring’ downplays these previous efforts.

2 comments:

  1. I think your last paragraph really sends this message home. Even cursory research would illustrate the differences between the social uprisings in MENA despite their similarities, but defining how their leaders governed and what context in history these movements play is important. Most of these countries have had sporadic movements over the last 60 years, and as you mention even independence and anti colonial movements have been constant. Bringing up the Arab Spring as only one successful movement downplays the importance that repeated social discontent has played over the years to get us where we are today. Many researchers argue not to look at regions and movements as monolithic, but in orientalist discourse it is always too easy to paint the Middle East as a homogenous area that operates under identical constraints.

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  2. As we mentioned in class, the demographic representations were nuanced for several reasons. In Tunisia we noted that as the movement was founded mostly as a labor and trade union movement, and as the country had a history of educated liberal elites, this demographic was mostly adults 30-50, whereas Egypt saw a much more broad-based coalition of different socioeconomic backgrounds and ages, disenfranchised educated young people, copts, muslims, although maybe not as many liberal elites as tunisia. The point is, the plurality of the movement is another way we can dissect the arguments against Orientalist ideologies. But chaos was rampant in some places more than others. Maybe the way we view it is because we don't even expect democracy to come from the region, which only shows how deep the consequences of post-colonial mishap can lead to.

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