Effectiveness of Nonviolent Action: The First Intifada

Nonviolent movements may start with a particular political objective, but their success is often most evident in the indirect effects they have on the systems they target. The first intifada failed to produce the outcome desired by the activists and grassroots committees that organized it: an independent Palestinian state has yet to be established. But, as Dajani argues, the intifada left its mark on both Palestinian and Israeli societies.

The intifada forced Israelis out of their willful ignorance of their army’s occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Images of Israeli soldiers brutally repressing with sophisticated arms peoples who defended themselves through largely nonviolent means brought the issue of the Palestinians to the forefront. As Dajani stated, the intifada “jolted” a dormant peace movement out of lethargy. This way, it succeeded in polarizing public opinion in Israel between hawkish elements and the peace movement. The gap between Israelis opposing the occupation and those who staunchly support it continues, and partly owes its existence to the intifada.

The impact of the intifada on Palestinian society is perhaps less widely examined, but just as significant. For Palestinians, feelings of empowerment that accompanied successful nonviolent actions were quickly replaced by weariness and frustration as a result of Israeli brutality in the face of protests. As the intifada continued, Israel employed increasingly brutal means of repressing protests. In response, the means through which the Palestinians responded to the occupation changed and, increasingly, violence came to characterize the intifada. Not only did this cause Israelis to fear Palestinian independence, but it also caused factions within Palestinian society. Seeing little for their nonviolent struggle, in addition to increasing economic and social strangulation, an increasing number of Palestinians turned to violent means against their occupiers. The Palestinian Authority, established after the Oslo Accords to govern West Bank and the Gaza Strip, was seen merely as a tool for continued Israeli domination of the occupied territories. Along with its perceived image as a tool for the occupiers, widespread corruption deprives the PA of the legitimacy it might have enjoyed amongst Palestinians. It is no surprise, then, that militant groups increased in popularity during the years following the establishment of the PA. This largely continues to be the case, and in the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip, the PA exercises little to no authority.

It remains to be seen if the ultimate goal of the intifada will ever be realized. Just as the brutal means used by Israel backfired in the way it tainted Israel’s image around the world, the intifada backfired in a way, as it sharpened the divide in Israeli society between hawks and those favoring a Palestinian state. The recent elections in Israel showed that hawkish elements in Israeli politics such as Netanyahu and his Likud party enjoy widespread public support. It is possible that Israel could tighten its control of the Palestinian territories, or implement policies that further endanger the possibility of Palestinian statehood. Alternatively, if future Israeli elections produce a result that favors Liberal elements within Israeli politics, accommodation of Palestinian demands becomes likely. It remains unclear what will happen in the long run. What is clear, though, is that the intifada highlighted the unsustainability of the status quo: Israel could no longer ignore the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and the Palestinians had reached a critical point that caused them to jolt into action against the occupation-by any means necessary.