What is the argument for “Arab nationalism”? What factors have worked against political integration in the MENA region? Could you envision a scenario where a supra-national entity like the European Union develops in the MENA region? Why/why not?
Proponents of Arab nationalism argue that Arab unity against western (and other external) influence will make the Arab world stronger. Nasser, as the undisputed leader of the Arab world during the 1950’s, was the leader of the pan-Arab movement, which sought unification of all Arab peoples from Iraq to Morocco.
If the 1950s were the glory years for pan-Arabism, succeeding decades have seen the ideology diminish in both significance and popularity. In the 1960s, Nasser was too preoccupied with economic troubles at home to consider any pan-Arab designs. Though he was still the champion of pan-Arabism, he was a king without a crown. The failure of the United Arab Republic to defeat Israel in the six-day-war knocked Nasser off the throne as the undisputed leader of the Arab world and undermined the fundamental ideological foundations of pan-Arabism. Nasser and other Arab leaders failed because they stressed unification over integration. Unification of all Arab countries under one state is impossible; instead, it is integration that can revive Arab nationalism. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) can provide a useful model for future Arab integration.
The short-lived union between Syria and Egypt can help us understand why a formal union wouldn’t work. Egypt and Syria did not share the same strategic goals, were on separate economic trajectories, and were not on the same page regarding what unification would entail. For the elite in Syria, unification meant larger markets. In Egypt, where the state was strong and the private sector marginalized, unification meant that the Syrian business elite would have to be controlled. In short, the U.A.R. was more about Egyptian domination than Arab unification. A similar scenario would play out if Arab states decided to unify today. The Arab states of today are too diverse, and have vastly diverging strategic goals to make unification possible.
On the contrary, the GCC has been relatively successful in bringing Arab states together in economic and military cooperation. It allows its member states a degree of autonomy, which means that states and their leaders retain their power. At the same time, economic partnerships, joint projects, and strategic military agreements allow for cooperation.
Arab nationalism was one of the first ideologies that gained favor in the post-colonial Middle East as a response to the effects of colonialism and the ongoing efforts by major powers to control the course of events in the region. Its most attractive selling point was that it rejected the arbitrary national divisions of the newly independent nation states and envisioned a single, unified Arab entity. This kind of ideology was a perfect vehicle for the resentment against colonial era wrongs and widespread aspirations to empower the Arabs and reclaim a sense of equality and pride on the world stage after years of struggle, as well as a way for Arab regimes to bolster their otherwise weak legitimacy.
Arab nationalism probably reached its peak during the presidency of Gamal Abd al-Nasir in Egypt during the late 50s, and particularly with the ill-advised and premature union between Egypt and Syria. It failed for many diverse reasons, but largely because of the persistent differences between the countries that made a fair union extremely difficult to achieve. Additionally, each state retained its own elite communities who strenuously resisted any dilution or abdication of their privileged positions in favor of unity.
Personally I doubt any EU-type structure could develop in the MENA region for at least the next 50 years. By the time Europe began forming the EU, the western European states had already established similar economic regimes, a broad consensus on representative government, similar institutions, and were not in the habit of routinely interfering in the internal affairs of their neighbors via media campaigns, secret funding to opposition groups, assassination attempts, etc. In contrast, the regimes of the MENA region are extremely unstable, untrusting, and unrepresentative. Foreign interference is assumed and routine, key state institutions are used to enrich elites or protect their privileges, rather than achieve their usual public purpose.
Furthermore, nearly every state in the region is heavily centralized, and governance is often more personal than institutional. These governments are very averse to ceding any type of power. One need only observe the discussions of federalism in various MENA states to understand the level of fear involved in any project to reduce central control. Federalism is usually equated with foreign or minority group efforts to split the state and gain control for nefarious purposes, rather than as a system for more effectively governing diverse societies. Any EU-type project would necessarily require painful compromises of state sovereignty (as several European states have found out) which the MENA regime are unwilling to make.
In my opinion, only in the aftermath of WW1 did the concept of Arab nationalism take the form of a political movement. Education played a vital part in glorifying the past, in raising political consciousness, and in awakening Arab nationalism among the young Arabs. Intellectuals, such as Michel Aflaq, rather than politicians were at the forefront of the movement. They borrowed the nationalist idea from the revolutions in European countries and they used it to try to chart a new path for Arab nations. But the Arab movement did not spread easily. There were fierce obstacles that stopped the Arab nationalist ideology from mobilizing people throughout the region. The first obstacle were the conflicting identities and competing loyalties to tribes, sects, and religions. The second obstacle was the continuous tensions between countries like Iraq, Syria, and Egypt, which meant that regional identities competed with the larger, all encompassing Arab identity. I think the closest concept to a supra-national entity like the EU was the concept of the united Muslim "umma", which means community. Islam was the other great supra-national ideology with a claim to the allegiance of the great majority of the Arabs. Islam had a broader catchment area than Pan-Arabism because it included all Muslims in the world and did not differentiate between Arab and non-Arab. The concept of Muslim Umma is a unity in which ethnicity, nationality, or country of residence plays no part.
Proponents of Arab nationalism argue that Arab unity against western (and other external) influence will make the Arab world stronger. Nasser, as the undisputed leader of the Arab world during the 1950’s, was the leader of the pan-Arab movement, which sought unification of all Arab peoples from Iraq to Morocco.
ReplyDeleteIf the 1950s were the glory years for pan-Arabism, succeeding decades have seen the ideology diminish in both significance and popularity. In the 1960s, Nasser was too preoccupied with economic troubles at home to consider any pan-Arab designs. Though he was still the champion of pan-Arabism, he was a king without a crown. The failure of the United Arab Republic to defeat Israel in the six-day-war knocked Nasser off the throne as the undisputed leader of the Arab world and undermined the fundamental ideological foundations of pan-Arabism. Nasser and other Arab leaders failed because they stressed unification over integration. Unification of all Arab countries under one state is impossible; instead, it is integration that can revive Arab nationalism. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) can provide a useful model for future Arab integration.
The short-lived union between Syria and Egypt can help us understand why a formal union wouldn’t work. Egypt and Syria did not share the same strategic goals, were on separate economic trajectories, and were not on the same page regarding what unification would entail. For the elite in Syria, unification meant larger markets. In Egypt, where the state was strong and the private sector marginalized, unification meant that the Syrian business elite would have to be controlled. In short, the U.A.R. was more about Egyptian domination than Arab unification. A similar scenario would play out if Arab states decided to unify today. The Arab states of today are too diverse, and have vastly diverging strategic goals to make unification possible.
On the contrary, the GCC has been relatively successful in bringing Arab states together in economic and military cooperation. It allows its member states a degree of autonomy, which means that states and their leaders retain their power. At the same time, economic partnerships, joint projects, and strategic military agreements allow for cooperation.
Arab nationalism was one of the first ideologies that gained favor in the post-colonial Middle East as a response to the effects of colonialism and the ongoing efforts by major powers to control the course of events in the region. Its most attractive selling point was that it rejected the arbitrary national divisions of the newly independent nation states and envisioned a single, unified Arab entity. This kind of ideology was a perfect vehicle for the resentment against colonial era wrongs and widespread aspirations to empower the Arabs and reclaim a sense of equality and pride on the world stage after years of struggle, as well as a way for Arab regimes to bolster their otherwise weak legitimacy.
ReplyDeleteArab nationalism probably reached its peak during the presidency of Gamal Abd al-Nasir in Egypt during the late 50s, and particularly with the ill-advised and premature union between Egypt and Syria. It failed for many diverse reasons, but largely because of the persistent differences between the countries that made a fair union extremely difficult to achieve. Additionally, each state retained its own elite communities who strenuously resisted any dilution or abdication of their privileged positions in favor of unity.
Personally I doubt any EU-type structure could develop in the MENA region for at least the next 50 years. By the time Europe began forming the EU, the western European states had already established similar economic regimes, a broad consensus on representative government, similar institutions, and were not in the habit of routinely interfering in the internal affairs of their neighbors via media campaigns, secret funding to opposition groups, assassination attempts, etc. In contrast, the regimes of the MENA region are extremely unstable, untrusting, and unrepresentative. Foreign interference is assumed and routine, key state institutions are used to enrich elites or protect their privileges, rather than achieve their usual public purpose.
Furthermore, nearly every state in the region is heavily centralized, and governance is often more personal than institutional. These governments are very averse to ceding any type of power. One need only observe the discussions of federalism in various MENA states to understand the level of fear involved in any project to reduce central control. Federalism is usually equated with foreign or minority group efforts to split the state and gain control for nefarious purposes, rather than as a system for more effectively governing diverse societies. Any EU-type project would necessarily require painful compromises of state sovereignty (as several European states have found out) which the MENA regime are unwilling to make.
In my opinion, only in the aftermath of WW1 did the concept of Arab nationalism take the form of a political movement. Education played a vital part in glorifying the past, in raising political consciousness, and in awakening Arab nationalism among the young Arabs. Intellectuals, such as Michel Aflaq, rather than politicians were at the forefront of the movement. They borrowed the nationalist idea from the revolutions in European countries and they used it to try to chart a new path for Arab nations. But the Arab movement did not spread easily. There were fierce obstacles that stopped the Arab nationalist ideology from mobilizing people throughout the region. The first obstacle were the conflicting identities and competing loyalties to tribes, sects, and religions. The second obstacle was the continuous tensions between countries like Iraq, Syria, and Egypt, which meant that regional identities competed with the larger, all encompassing Arab identity.
ReplyDeleteI think the closest concept to a supra-national entity like the EU was the concept of the united Muslim "umma", which means community. Islam was the other great supra-national ideology with a claim to the allegiance of the great majority of the Arabs. Islam had a broader catchment area than Pan-Arabism because it included all Muslims in the world and did not differentiate between Arab and non-Arab. The concept of Muslim Umma is a unity in which ethnicity, nationality, or country of residence plays no part.