Islamists and Social Movements

First off, Wickham makes two things clear from the start: that the Islamic movement's base in Egypt, from the beginning of its rise in popularity in the 1970s, was educated students and professionals (unlike what might otherwise be assumed and unlike class divisions in other countries); and that the vast majority has been, and continues to be, decidedly nonviolent. I think that these points are significant because of the tendency that Western perspectives and media have to demonize anything "Islamic", whether intentionally or otherwise.

As has been pointed out, she is among the first of Western scholars to deeply examine Islamic movements within the framework of social movement research, as well as contributing to it. She points out that in cases such as Egypt where mass resistance seeking fundamental change against authoritarian rule is against the best interests of the individual and that, moreover, the typical theories of unfulfilled grievances or cultural identification do not serve as complete explanations as to why Islamic movements have been so successful. For one thing, she asserts that it has not been so much collective action but the decades-long structures and networks in place. The authoritarian regime was blind to the extent of these these structures and support because they were on the "periphery", due to necessity and inability to act through central political structures. Through these localized networks, the Islamic movement was able to mobilize people politically through giving people *new* motivations (interpreting Islamic ideologies in ways that made the public good take priority over individual benefit) and opportunities for collective action.

 I believe it's a combination of Wickham's theory of pervasive structures and ideologies in place, combined with the overthrow of the authoritarian regimes that suppressed them, combined with the high unemployment, ongoing economic instability and inequalities that have fueled a myriad of reasons for frustration have certainly played a role. In class, we have often referred to the gap that the state has failed to adequately fill, and where Islamist movements see an opportunity to step in, from helping to meet basic needs to education to giving a voice to segments of the population that feel overlooked. I still believe these reasons to be valid, as well as the fact that both the Mobarek and Ben Ali regimes were for decades supported by the secular West - billions in military and other aid, much from the US government but also from IFI's - and that was not lost on the general public. I also believe that we can not dismiss the idea that a militarized state often ends up radicalizing groups with fewer economic prospects, and that includes educated youth struggling with unemployment, etc.