For the most part I find Bellin's arguments compelling, even in a post-2011 context. The argument that coercive and patrimonial institutions make democratization more difficult should not be an overly controversial one.
I do think that Bellin's account understates the importance of both popular mobilization and economic factors. Bellin relegates popular mobilization to a single factor influencing the strength of MENA's coercive institutions. Specifically, she concludes that "Where that coercive apparatus remains in tact and willfully opposed to political reform, democratization will not occur." To make this judgement largely denies the publics of MENA states agency in the democratic futures of their states. Given the popular uprisings of 2011, it would probably be more accurate to say, "Where the coercive apparatus' capability and will to repress political reform exceeds the will of the public pursue it, democratization will not occur." As the 2011 uprisings show, coercive institutions need not be totally dismantled before change can occur. Though many of the states involved in these uprisings continue to face significant obstacles to popular mobilization--such as the divide discussed by Asef Bayat between Islamist and secular groups that can be seen today in Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt--in these circumstances I would view popular mobilization as a factor directly competing with coercive institutions, rather than a factor in evaluating their strength.
The uprisings of 2011, which were motivated significantly by economic factors, would seem to demonstrate that the power of coercive institutions can face significant challenges from publics even in the absence of significant changes in the other factors Bellin mentions. Bayat's "quiet encroachment" also would seem to place a heavier emphasis on economics and popular mobilization than Bellin's model provides.
Anthony, I think that in light of the Arab Revolts and Bellin's argument that "Where that coercive apparatus remains in tact and willfully opposed to political reform, democratization will not occur" it is also important to take into consideration the destruction but refashioning of the coercive apparatus. For example, Egyptian Presidents Al-Sisi came to power in 2013 in what can only be characterized as a coup d'etat. Despite the fact that many Egyptians were unsatisfied with his rule during his time in office, removing an elected leader without due process is far from a democratic practice. While Al-Sisi remains in power due to his success in the 2014 presidential election, the coup is a troubling reminder that perhaps coercion is not as easily disposed of as one might think.
ReplyDeleteAdditionally, as you stated in the last part of your post, the uprisings of 2011 were motivated by economic factors - ones that it is likely have not improved entirely since four years ago. Popular displeasure with the president's plan to build a new capital city which will cost US$45 billion is indicative of other, more immediate concerns that Egyptians have with their economy. Whether popular mobilization is in direct competition with coercive institutions will be put to the test this year as Egypt mobilizes for parliamentary elections.